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SDL Security Development Lifecycle
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zapr A CLI wrapper for Zed Attack Proxy
vi
Contents
Abbreviations and Acronyms v
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Problem statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Research goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Structure of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Background: security testing and agile development 5
2.1 Security implications of the progress of software development
practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1 Waterfall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.2 Agile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.3 Scrum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.4 Lean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.5 DevOps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Existing methods for secure software development . . . . . . . 9
2.2.1 Checklist approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.2 Provable security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.3 Linus’s law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.4 Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) . . . . 11
2.2.5 Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Continuous security testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3 Security testing methods and tools 15
3.1 Vulnerability scanning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1.1 Arachni . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1.2 OWASP ZAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1.3 Nikto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1.4 w3af . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2 Static vulnerability analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
vii
3.2.1 FindSecurityBugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2.2 SonarQube . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2.3 Brakeman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2.4 phpcs-security-audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2.5 eslint-config-scanjs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2.6 JSPrime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3 Configuration checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3.1 Lynis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3.2 MySQLTuner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.3.3 SSLyze . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.3.4 unix-privesc-check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.3.5 Linux Security Auditing Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.3.6 Security monkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.4 Security verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.4.1 Gauntlt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.4.2 BDD-security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.4.3 Mittn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.5 Dependency verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.5.1 Bundler-audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.5.2 HolePicker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.5.3 Dawnscanner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.5.4 OWASP Dependency Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.5.5 pliers-npm-security-check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.5.6 nsp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.5.7 SensioLabs Security Advisories Checker . . . . . . . . . 35
3.5.8 Versions Maven Plugin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5.9 Retire.js . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5.10 Gradle witness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4 Security testing methods in continuous integration 40
4.1 General guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.1.1 Work management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.1.2 Tool adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.1.3 Tool maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.1.4 Test targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.1.5 Results handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.2 Vulnerability scanning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.3 Static vulnerability analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.4 Configuration checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.5 Security verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
viii
4.6 Dependency verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5 Case studies 51
5.1 Project A: a Ruby on Rails web application backend . . . . . 52
5.1.1 Preliminary analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.1.2 Brakeman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.1.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.2 Project B: a Java + Scala web application backend . . . . . . 54
5.2.1 Preliminary analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.2.2 FindSecurityBugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.2.3 OWASP dependency check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.2.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.3 Project C: a Scala + Java web application backend . . . . . . 57
5.3.1 Preliminary analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.3.2 FindSecurityBugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.4 Project D: a Java web application backend + AngularJS frontend 58
5.4.1 Preliminary analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.4.2 OWASP Dependency check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.4.3 Versions Maven Plugin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.4.4 Retire.js . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.4.5 FindSecurityBugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.4.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.5 Common observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
6 Discussion 66
6.1 Observations and open questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.2 Challenges and limitations of continuous security testing . . . 68
6.3 Limitations of this work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
6.4 Future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
6.5 Summary of findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6.5.1 Integration methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6.5.2 Challenges of continuous security testing . . . . . . . . 72
6.5.3 Characteristics of tools suitable for continuous security
testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
7 Conclusions 74
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction
From the 1990s, there has been a trend in software development method-
ologies towards shorter development cycle times1. Agile methods stress the
importance of delivering working software frequently, on a scale of weeks in-
stead of months as before. The Scrum methodology brought with it closer
collaboration between business people and developers. Lean software devel-
opment emphasizes the importance of eliminating waste in the development
process in order to deliver software faster. The DevOps — short for ”Devel-
opment and Operations” — movement takes this progress even further by
promoting, among other things, more extensive use of automation and better
collaboration between different actors in the delivery pipeline, including but
not limited to developers and operations personnel. In practice one of the
intended effects is to shorten development cycle times.
For the developers of web applications and Software-as-a-Service offer-
ings, these shorter cycle times have been especially pronounced because the
centrally hosted nature of the software makes deployment of new versions
relatively easy and quick.
In the web application industry, frequent deployments have been a normal
practice for many years now. For example, already in 2009 at Flickr software
changes were deployed to production 10 times a day[1], in 2012 at Etsy there
were an average of 25 deployments a day[24], and in 2013 at Facebook new
code was usually deployed to production daily[13].
The developers of desktop software have had to put a bit more effort into
converting the faster pace of development into more frequent releases, as
traditional release channels for desktop software have not been very accom-
modating to releasing software frequently. Desktop software release channels
have been improving, however, and currently many operating systems come
1Cycle time meaning the time it takes to go from an application/feature/change idea
to a having it implemented and deployed into production.
1
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with package managers and underlying software repositories that make it rel-
atively easy for both developers to release new versions of software and users
to keep their versions up to date. On operating systems that do not feature
such a capability, desktop software now commonly includes an updater to
keep the end users’ versions up to date.
As for mobile software, all the major platforms provide their own appli-
cation release channels, though it might take some time for an update to be
reviewed and green-lighted for distribution to end clients. For example, be-
tween September 2013 and August 2014, the average review delays in Apple’s
iOS App Store fluctuated between 4 and 8 days, with some apps experiencing
as long as 30 day review delays during the first half of August 2014.[23]
The trend of ever more frequent deployments or releases is also evident
in current version numbering practices. In the past, desktop software was
versioned using a scheme such as semantic versioning[20] with at most a
major, minor and patch version numbers. Currently, it is common to include
a build number in addition. In many web applications and Software-as-a-
Service offerings, the user might not even know which version of the software
they are using, or the version number displayed might just be a version
control commit id hash.
This fast pace of modern software development presents some challenges
from the software security point of view. How useful is a yearly or quarterly
security audit, or other similarly infrequent security activity, in the software
development process in which a new feature can be ready for deployment into
production within days of being just an idea in someone’s head? How long do
the findings of an audit stay valid in such fast-paced development processes?
Conversely, how to maintain a reasonable level of assurance that an applica-
tion is secure enough when deploying new code to production multiple times
a day?
1.1 Problem statement
Modern, fast-paced software development methodologies fit poorly together
with traditional security practices. Since in most cases the benefits of cur-
rent software development methodologies outweigh the perceived value of
traditional security practices, those practices are largely relegated to rubber
stamps with little actual value. We need new ways of ensuring software se-
curity. This means a shift from traditional control points that are few and
far between to a more continuous workflow that takes place in parallel with
regular development.
In this thesis, I will explore one way of doing software security work on a
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continuous basis, namely how to use the currently available security testing
tools paired with continuous integration systems to provide a basic level of
confidence that the software is safe to deploy regardless of the speed of the
development process.
1.2 Research goals
This thesis has the following goals:
1. Find methods and techniques for integrating software security test-
ing tools into a modern software development process implementing
DevOps practices such as infrastructure automation and continuous
deployment.
2. Analyse the challenges related to continuous security assurance. Present
lessons learned from analysis of security testing tool documentation,
related literature and case studies in integrating tools to development
processes.
3. Identify the characteristics of a security testing tool that determine
whether it is applicable to continuous security testing.
In the process, we will also review existing security testing tools to find
ones that are suitable for continuous testing. We will then test some of the
tools in case studies to verify the validity of our selection criteria and evaluate
the usefulness of the tools.
Our primary interest lies in achieving continuous security testing of even
the most basic kind, preferably with minimal effort and security expertise
required on the part of the software developers. The test suites can then be
extended for more comprehensive coverage and other desirable qualities of
the actual security testing.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides background
and context for the problem scrutinized in this thesis, as well as initial reason-
ing for the approach taken. Chapter 3 lists the different types of automated
security testing methods and available tools of each type that were consid-
ered to have potential for continuous security testing, with a brief review of
each. Chapter 4 covers methods and techniques of integrating the different
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security testing methods into the development process for continuous secu-
rity testing. Chapter 5 presents the results of case studies in adding security
testing tools to the continuous integration processes of software development
projects. Chapter 6 contains reflections on the types of tools tested and on
the effectiveness of different ways of integrating them into the development
workflow. Chapter 7 summarizes the work and provides conclusions.
Chapter 2
Background: security testing and
agile development
In this chapter, we briefly cover some of the most significant advances in soft-
ware development methods and their implications from the software security
point of view. We will also note some existing models for secure software
development that have arisen to cope with the later software development
processes. Finally, we will briefly discuss the possibilities of continuous secu-
rity testing.
2.1 Security implications of the progress of
software development practices
Software development methodologies that have evolved since the 1990s have
among other aspects incorporated consecutive changes to processes, practices
and tools meant to shorten development cycle times.
Many changes brought on by this evolution have also affected software
security work. In this section, we note some of the most significant aspects
of different development methodologies from the software security point of
view.
2.1.1 Waterfall
Before the agile revolution, waterfall projects were the standard approach
to software development. The stages of a waterfall project, presented in
figure 2.1, are performed one after the other with little or no overlap between
consecutive stages.
5
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND: SECURITY TESTING ANDAGILE DEVELOPMENT6
Requirements
Design
Implementation
Verification
Maintenance
Figure 2.1: Stages of the traditional waterfall development model.
Typical project lengths and release intervals for waterfall projects are
anything from months to years.
Security work in a waterfall project typically involves one-time practices
such as a security audit of the architecture in the Design stage and security
testing and auditing of the completed implementation in the Verification
stage.
2.1.2 Agile
Around the 1990s, recognition of software project failures caused by the rigid-
ity of the traditional waterfall model gave rise to an agile approach to soft-
ware development. The failures occurred in many cases because successfully
eliciting all the requirements before implementation in a complex project
is extremely difficult, and the waterfall model did not allow for effectively
responding to changing requirements once implementation had started.
The agile approach lays out a lightweight software development method-
ology focused on the ability to respond to changes in requirements. The
principles of this approach were codified in the Agile manifesto[8] published
by the Agile Alliance in 2001.
Two of the agile principles state that:
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”Our highest priority is to satisfy the customer through early and
continuous delivery of valuable software.”
”Deliver working software frequently, from a couple of weeks to
a couple of months, with a preference to the shorter timescale.”
This focus on delivering software early and continuously does not fit well
together with the way security work has been done in waterfall projects.
To achieve the same security impact in an agile project, architecture audits
would conceivably need to be done every time the architecture changes, and
implementation audits and security testing before each delivery.
2.1.3 Scrum
Figure 2.2: The Scrum process. Image by Lakeworks from the Wikimedia
Commons (CC-BY-SA 3.0)
Scrum, arguably the most famous and widely adopted agile develop-
ment framework, was first introduced to the world in the OOPSLA (Object-
Oriented Programming, Systems, Languages & Applications) conference of
1995 [25]. A book describing the method in more detail was published in
2001 [22].
A simplified illustration of the scrum model of software development is
presented in figure 2.2. In contrast to the waterfall model, the scrum model
splits the whole project into smaller iterations that normally last 1-4 weeks.
Each of these iterations, called sprints, is effectively a mini-project containing
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work from all the phases of a waterfall project and resulting in a shippable
increment of software.
The frequency of security work required is quite different than in a wa-
terfall project. An architecture security audit would be required once in the
early stages of the project, like in waterfall, after the drafting of the ini-
tial architecture, but a re-audit would be required in each sprint where the
architecture is changed. Security testing, on the other hand, would be nec-
essary in each sprint since the software changes implemented in each sprint
are intended to be deliverable to production.
2.1.4 Lean
Lean software development[19] is a subculture within the agile software de-
velopment scene. It is an adoption of the lean manufacturing principles of
the Toyota Production System[18] into the software development domain.
The most relevant Lean principles from the security point of view are:
1. Eliminate waste
3. Decide as late as possible
4. Deliver as fast as possible
Principle 1, ”Eliminate waste”, can be used to justify not following secu-
rity practices that are perceived to have too little payoff compared to the time
and resources required, because waste as intended in this context includes
delay in the software development process.
Principle 4, ”Deliver as fast as possible”, can put pressure on doing secu-
rity work sloppily in order to not hold back delivery of the software.
Finally, principle 3, ”Decide as late as possible”, means that the software
architecture is expected to evolve during development. This means changes
affecting security can and will happen at any point during the lifetime of
the software, so an unknown amount of security audits would be required.
Neither is it necessarily known much in advance when an audit is required.
2.1.5 DevOps
DevOps – short for Development and Operations – is an ideology that pro-
motes collaboration and communications between stakeholders in all stages
of software development, from idea conception to production. Automation
of software deployment and infrastructure setup is also an essential part of
DevOps.
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A series of ”DevOps days” in Belgium in 2009 popularized DevOps as a
term. Many of the core principles and practices of DevOps did exist even
before that, but after ”DevOps days” the movement begun picking up con-
siderable global momentum. DevOps has since become a major influence on
software development practices.
In this thesis, we are mainly interested in the movement’s contributions
to faster cycle times via infrastructure, testing and deployment automation
and the implications that these have for software security.
The ”Infrastructure as Code” principle promoted by the DevOps move-
ment opens up new possibilities for continuous testing during software de-
velopment. Automated server provisioning and configuration combined with
automated application deployment provides the capability to easily set up
full-fledged, disposable testing and staging environments. This capability can
drastically reduce the setup costs involved in security testing, thus making
it feasible to do more frequently.
The emphasis on sharing of tools where it makes sense means that secu-
rity testing tools, or at least their results should be available to all relevant
personnel in addition to the security experts. In practice this would mean
developers and operations personnel.
The principle of spreading knowledge via open communication and work-
ing together calls for security experts to disseminate their expertise to devel-
opers and operations personnel by working closely together.
Relevant, fast feedback to interested parties in this context means that
the results of security testing should be accessible to the team whose respon-
sibility it is to react to them, as well as to the people in charge of prioritizing
work.
These practices promoted by the DevOps movement form a foundation
for a more continuous way of doing security work than has ever before been
possible.
2.2 Existing methods for secure software de-
velopment
Several different methods and frameworks for secure software development
have been designed in response to the challenges imposed on software security
work by modern software development methodologies. We cover briefly some
of the most notable approaches in this section.
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2.2.1 Checklist approach
The checklist approach to secure software development involves taking a
checklist of software security practices and incorporating some or all applica-
ble practices from it into your development lifecycle. Generally, these check-
lists only specify what should be accomplished, leaving the actual method to
use up to the reader.
Many institutions and authors have published secure coding checklists,
with some being very broad and general purpose and others targeted for a
more specific audience or use case. For a general purpose example, see the
OWASP Secure Coding Practices Quick Reference Guide1.
2.2.2 Provable security
While the term is usually used in cryptography to refer to mathematical
proofs, provable security can also be applied more broadly to software secu-
rity. Such proofs involve modeling both an attacker and the system under
scrutiny, and rely heavily on the correctness of the models. Optimally, the
actual code of the system can be verified to match the model of the system,
for example by using a static analysis tool.
2.2.3 Linus’s law
Formulated by Eric S. Raymond in ”The Cathedral and the Bazaar”[21] and
embraced to a large extent by the Open Source community, Linus’s Law
states that ”given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow”, or more formally
”Given a large enough beta-tester and co-developer base, almost
every problem will be characterized quickly and the fix will be
obvious to someone.”
While this claim was not strictly made to concern security issues, it has
been adopted as an approach for combating security bugs.
The same principle of distributed review can also be applied to other
types of security work, such as architecture reviews and other methods for
finding security flaws.
1https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Secure_Coding_Practices_-_
Quick_Reference_Guide
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Project phase Security activities
Training 1. Core Security Training
Requirements 2. Establish Security Requirements
3. Create Quality Gates/Bug Bars
4. Perform Security and Privacy Risk Assessments
Design 5. Establish Design Requirements
6. Perform Attack Surface Analysis/ Reduction
7. Use Threat Modeling
Implementation 8. Use Approved Tools
9. Deprecate Unsafe Functions
10. Perform Static Analysis
Verification 11. Perform Dynamic Analysis
12. Perform Fuzz Testing
13. Conduct Attack Surface Review
Release 14. Create an Incident Response Plan
15. Conduct Final Security Review
16. Certify Release and Archive
Response Execute Incident Response Plan
Table 2.1: Security activities of Microsoft SDL
2.2.4 Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL)
Microsoft SDL, outlined in the 2006 book ”The security development lifecycle”[14],
is a
”software development process that helps developers build more
secure software and address security compliance requirements
while reducing development cost”
It maps several security practices to different software lifecycle phases, as
seen in table 2.1. In addition to the book, there are comprehensive online
resources, including tools, available for free.2
While the SDL advocates the use of various security testing practices,
in an automated manner where applicable, it mainly stresses that they be
performed at regular intervals instead of continuously.
Microsoft SDL also has an official guideline for adopting the SDL prac-
tices into an agile development process. The guideline maps all the security
activities of the standard SDL into three different categories that fit into the
agile development process:
2https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/sdl/
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Every-sprint practices Essential security practices that should be per-
formed in every release.
Bucket practices Important security practices that must be completed on
a regular basis but can be spread across multiple sprints during the
project lifetime.
One-Time practices Foundational security practices that must be estab-
lished once at the start of every new Agile project.
An interactive representation of the mapping of security activities to the
agile development process is available online3.
2.2.5 Other
Other existing methods that we will not go into detail in this work, but
will mention here so interested readers can look them up: Cigital’s Secu-
rity Touchpoints, Common Criteria, OWASP Comprehesive, Lightweight Ap-
plication Security Process (CLASP), OWASP Software Assurance Maturity
Model (SAMM), NIST Special Publication 800-64 (Security Considerations
in the System Development Life Cycle).
Some agile security approaches can also be found from research litera-
ture, for example Baca and Carlsson[3] have presented an approach to secure
agile software development in which they adopted the most suitable security
engineering practices from Microsoft SDL, Cigital Touchpoints and Common
criteria into an agile development process.
2.3 Continuous security testing
Many methods for secure software development exist, a few of which were
mentioned in the previous section. Some of them involve testing or analysis of
various kinds using automated tools. However, none of them really promote
doing security testing, or any other security work, continuously.
It would seem that the security community has not yet really started to
leverage the modern capabilities of infrastructure, testing and deployment
automation. Granted, certain kinds of security work, such as architectural
review, might not be feasible candidates for automation. Nevertheless, it is
likely that at least some type of security testing could be performed auto-
matically and continuously.
3https://www.microsoft.com/security/sdl/discover/sdlagile.aspx
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According to Boehm et al.[9], the fixing of a software defect is both
cheaper and faster the earlier in the development process it is caught. As
security issues are a type of defect, it then makes obvious sense to try to
detect them as early as possible. Using modern software development tools,
”as early as possible” equates to pre-commit (via tool IDE integrations and
pre-commit hooks), per-commit (tests run by CI system for all commits) and
nightly (for time intensive cases, such as extensive E2E testing of large sys-
tems) testing. All of these can be considered reasonably continuous testing.
We do acknowledge that there are numerous possible issues and open
questions regarding continuous security testing, some of which are:
• The feasibility of automation. Depending on the test case at hand and
the testing methods suited to it, automation might not always be a
realistic goal.
• The results produced by security testing tools are in most cases not
pass/fail, instead often requiring further analysis and/or verification.
This means they mostly cannot be handled as easily as unit tests in CI
systems.
• How much security expertise is required for a basic level of security
testing?
• How much effort goes into setting up automated continuous security
testing? How about possible maintenance of the setup and handling
the results produced?
• How frequently is it possible, and on the other hand meaningful, to
perform security testing? For each commit, daily, weekly? On what
factors does this depend on?
Despite the many open questions and uncertainty involved, we are con-
fident that useful levels of continuous security testing are achievable with
reasonable effort even with currently available methods and tools.
2.4 Summary
The evolution of software development methodologies since the 1990s towards
faster development cycle times and more frequent releases has imposed nu-
merous challenges on software security work.
More lately, the proliferation of infrastructure, testing and deployment
automation has also brought with it previously unseen opportunities for doing
security testing continuously alongside the actual development work.
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Unfortunately, the software security community has not yet really started
to exploit these new opportunities. Despite this, we are confident that a use-
ful level of continuous security testing is achievable using currently available
methods and tools.
Chapter 3
Security testing methods and tools
In this chapter, we analyse existing security testing methods and tools to
determine the feasibility of integrating them into a CI system. The source
material for this analysis are publications on security testing methods and
tools that we have deemed to have potential for continuous security testing,
and 29 selected security testing tools along with their documentation.
For each security testing method, we present a general description, an
analysis of its applicability to continuous security testing based the charac-
teristics outlined below, and present existing tools representing the testing
method in question. From the presented tools we pick some for use in case
studies in Chapter 5.
The high-level characteristics we have deemed to most affect the suitabil-
ity of tools for continuous security testing are:
• Ease of integration into the development workflow. This breaks down
into two parts, first of which is how easy it is to execute the tool from
a CI job, and the second how easily the results produced by the tool
can be interpreted and presented in the CI system. This is mainly a
tool-specific measure.
• The amount of initial work required for meaningful results. How much
configuration does the tool require, what and how many parameters,
is it easy to learn. In case of adoption into an existing project does
it produce many false positives and can they be easily checked and
managed. The security testing method mainly determines this, but an
individual tool’s implementation also has an effect.
• The amount of continuous work alongside software development that
the tool requires. How much effort goes into keeping the tools up to date
to catch new vulnerabilities, how much work into processing the results
15
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produced by the tool? Are there efficient mechanisms for verifying
findings, managing false positives, handling the results of consecutive
runs etc? Can some of this work be spread across projects and teams?
This is also mainly determined by the method, but also influenced by
an individual tool’s implementation.
• How much security expertise is required for meaningful use of the tool.
Ideally, we would want tools usable with little to no security expertise
on part of the developers to generate meaningful results. This mainly
depends on the security testing method.
It is worth noting that we limit our review mainly to open source / free
security testing tools, even though commercial tools are often considered bet-
ter according to various metrics like the thoroughness and accuracy of results
[7]. We do this because we are mostly interested in the general principles of
the technical and process integration of the tools into a development process.
In the context of developing security-sensitive software, the benefits of using
a commercial tool might well justify its cost.
3.1 Vulnerability scanning
Vulnerability scanning seems to have considerable potential for our use case.
Scanners usually include some sort of a web application crawler that can be
used to map possible attack vectors, and thus running some form of basic
scan against a web application should require very little configuration or
security expertise.
Despite this, the scans can usually be customized quite heavily to fit the
specific needs of each use case. Meaningful scan customization, though, can
require a significant amount of general security expertise, in-depth knowledge
of the target app and expertise in using the specific scanner. Nevertheless,
the end result is that these tools are versatile and can be utilized to different
lengths depending on an organization’s available expertise and expendable
effort.
In addition, while meaningful scan customization requires security exper-
tise, the reports generated by these tools generally provide understandable
enough descriptions of vulnerabilities found that little security expertise is
required for reviewing scan results.
Another advantage that vulnerability scanners have over some other se-
curity testing tools is that because they take a black box approach to security
testing, the same scanner can be used regardless of the implementation de-
tails and technology choices of the target application. A downside to this
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approach is that all scanners require a functioning test instance of the tar-
get application to be set up, which will require some effort and computing
resources. This has effectively prohibited using vulnerability scanners for
continuous testing during software development before the advent of modern
infrastructure, testing and deployment automation methods.
Vulnerability scanners are reasonably good at detecting the most basic
(and common) forms of vulnerabilities. Some examples are SQL injections
and cross site scripting[7, 11], which rank as 1st and 3rd in OWASP’s Top
10 Most Critical Web Application Security Risks 2013 [26]. As such, vulner-
ability scanners can be very useful for achieving a basic level of confidence
in an application’s security.
On the other hand, according to several studies[7, 11, 15] vulnerability
scanners lack detection capability against more complex forms of XSS, SQL
injection and other vulnerabilities. The studies in question were published
in 2010, though, so there has been ample time for improvement since then.
And indeed, multiple commercial products1,2 have later claimed detection
capability for more complex vulnerability types such as DOM-XSS.
For best results, the vulnerability scanner should be selected to fit the
target, since most vulnerability scanners are geared toward detecting certain
types of vulnerabilities. This is especially if an application’s infrastructure
incorporates some widely used components, such as a popular CMS plat-
form. There are usually vulnerability scanners focusing specifically on de-
tecting vulnerabilities in such components. Some examples are WPScan3 for
WordPress, CMS Explorer4 for multiple CMS solutions and OWASP Joomla!
Security Scanner5 for Joomla.
There are some limitations, too. One is that scans can easily take a lot of
time if not specifically crafted to fit the target application. For example, a
crawler might want to visit each individual item’s page in a web shop where
such pages are dynamically generated and items can easily number in the
thousands and upwards from there. This means that in most cases it is not
practical to run scans like unit tests continually against every commit in CI
to get immediate feedback, but instead maybe as nightly runs. Of course,
the time taken for scans can be considerably shortened by running a more
targeted scan.
1http://blog.portswigger.net/2014/07/burp-gets-new-javascript-analysis.
html
2https://dominator.mindedsecurity.com/
3http://wpscan.org/
4https://code.google.com/p/cms-explorer/
5https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Joomla_
Vulnerability_Scanner_Project
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In addition, errors in application logic are not within a vulnerability scan-
ner’s ability to detect. For example, being able to order from a web store
without paying is not something a vulnerability scanner will raise alarms
about.
Another factor in scanning times is that the scanning can require quite a
bit of infrastructure. For speedy scans, multiple scanning engine dispatchers
are usually required, along with the actual scan orchestrator application and
database to store results in. Moreover, after removing that bottleneck, the
limiting factor becomes how well the application under scan is able to cope
with all the requests resulting from the scan, so for optimal speed more
resources might be required on that end, too.
Vulnerability scanners also add new detection capabilities via updates to
the tool itself or via new plugins or updates to existing ones, so latest versions
of the tools and their plugins should be used for best results.
Analysis of the characteristics laid out at the start of this chapter:
Workflow integration Easy to trigger from CI, but findings at best repre-
sentable as separate HTML reports for each scan in CI. Only Arachni
tracks findings across scans. Time taken by scans practically limits
continuousness to nightly testing.
Initial work Some scanners require infrastructure for the scanner to be
setup, some do not. All scanners require a working target application
to be set up. All scanners can do a default scan without any initial
configuration.
Continuous work Some work required periodically for keeping the tool up
to date. Reviewing results can take a considerable amount of effort,
especially if the scans are not well targeted.
Security expertise Required for effective scan customization. Results should
be reviewable to some extent without much security expertise, as the
tools provide generally provide good descriptions of the issues found.
However, without security expertise it can be difficult in many cases to
determine if a warning reported by a scanner is an actual issue or not.
3.1.1 Arachni
Arachni6 is a vulnerability scanner focused on web application security.
6http://www.arachni-scanner.com/
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It provides a convenient automation interface via its CLI tool. The re-
sults of a scan are exportable into an output format suitable for automated
processing, so it should be relatively easy to integrate into a CI system.
In addition to the CLI, Arachni features a web interface that can be used
for both running scans and reviewing the potential issues found in them. So,
false positive management could be done through it.
Arachni also includes the concept of scan revisions, and through these
can intelligently manage issues found across multiple successive scans of the
same target. In a CI setup this should prove useful.
Another feature not found in most other scanners is the ability to utilize
separate scan dispatchers, which should make Arachni scans easy to scale.
At the time of writing, the Arachni project is actively developed and
overall seems very promising for our use case.
3.1.2 OWASP ZAP
The OWASP Zed Attack Proxy Project7 is web application penetration test-
ing tool. It is mainly intended for use through the provided GUI, but also
features a CLI that can be used to either run the process as a daemon or to
run simple one-off scans.
There is a ZAProxy Plugin8 available for Jenkins, so CI integration for
that case is simple. A running ZAP installation is needed by this plugin,
though, so some intial setup effort is required.
On other CI systems either the CLI or a third party CLI wrapper called
zapr9 could be used in CI, although currently neither supports all the features
available via the ZAP GUI.
Triggering simple scans in CI using zapr or the CLI is relatively easy and
the results are available as JSON (from zapr), XML (from the CLI) or as
a structured plaintext summary. Zapr does require a running and properly
configured ZAP installation to be available to do the actual scanning, though,
so some setup effort is needed. In contrast, the CLI can be used to run scans
without a separately running ZAP instance.
For more complex scanning the ZAP API can be used programmatically,
and results are also available through it in XML and JSON formats. The
downside is that only the core features are available through the API. ZAP
is actively developed, however, and future versions are intended to steadily
increase the functionality available via the API.
7https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project
8https://wiki.jenkins-ci.org/display/JENKINS/ZAProxy+Plugin
9https://github.com/garethr/zapr
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ZAP does not appear to support any notion of successive scans, and
as such does not provide a way for effective management of the results of
scanning in CI.
3.1.3 Nikto
Nikto10 is a popular open source web server assessment tool. It is aimed at
finding vulnerabilities in web servers and associated infrastructure, not in
actual web applications served by the web servers.
Since Nikto is a Perl script, no initial setup beyond having Perl installed
is required. It has a mechanism for automatically updating itself.
Running basic scans via CLI is easy, and scans can be customized to
perform faster scans doing only the desired tests.
The results can be written in multiple different formats including XML,
and as such should be possible to integrate into a CI system.
No mechanism for tracking issues across scans or managing findings exists
in Nikto, so a separate solution for those functionalities would be required
for effective use in CI.
3.1.4 w3af
W3af11 stands for ”Web Application Attack and Audit Framework”. It is
an open source project, and intended to be a platform for web application
vulnerability assessment and penetration testing. It includes functionality
for crawling a web application for attack vectors, auditing the found attack
vectors for vulnerabilities and for exploiting the found vulnerabilities.
The w3af documentation includes good instructions for getting started,
and the installation is straightforward.
Scans can be run using either the provided GUI or CLI. The CLI com-
mands can be automated using the scripting functionality of the tool. W3af
also exposes a REST API using which the scanning can be automated using
any programming language of choice. Multiple output formats, including
XML, are available via plugins. As such, integration into a CI system is
doable with some effort.
W3af also has a feature for self-updating and supports crawling and au-
diting JavaScript, Flash and Java applet targets.
10http://www.cirt.net/Nikto2
11http://w3af.org
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3.2 Static vulnerability analysis
Static vulnerability analysers search for signs of Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVEs)12 or other dangerous code patterns. Since new detection
sets are added via tool updates, a scheme for keeping these tools up to date
should also be put in place when adopting them for running in a CI system.
A potential disadvantage with these tools is that they are often program-
ming language specific, although commercial ones often support multiple lan-
guages. Relatively good analysers exist for older and established languages
like C or Java, but more recent languages or ones that have only recently
begun to grow in usage and importance, such as JavaScript or Go, may lack
these tools completely.
The input of a static analysis tool can be either source code, bytecode
(for languages that compile into bytecode) or machine code.
This means that a static analysis tool that analyses a language’s byte-
code can also analyse the code of newer languages if they compile to the
same bytecode format. So for example, newer JVM-based languages can be
analysed using Java bytecode static analysis tools.
3rd party libraries could also conceivably be run through static analy-
sis if extra care was desired in evaluating the security of an application’s
dependencies.
Despite dynamically typed languages being more challenging to analyse
than statically typed ones, the methods of static analysis have fortunately
progressed far enough so that static analysis tools are currently available for
both types of languages.
Even static analysis that is not strictly security-focused is usually well
worth performing from the security point of view. This is because security
issues often arise as a side effect from bugs or bad coding practices, against
which static analysis can be a valuable tool. [10]
A potential issue with using static analysis tools is that they can produce
considerable amounts of false positives. The proportion of false positives to
actual valid findings varies by tool and case, but can be at least as high as
50 false positives for each true positive. Because of this, an efficient method
of managing false positives is vital for the usefulness of these tools. [31]
Analysis of the characteristics laid out at the start of this chapter:
Workflow integration Easy to trigger from CI and results can be repre-
sented and reviewed through existing static analysis plugins or features
of CI systems. Largely usable in developer IDEs to detect issues even
before CI.
12https://cve.mitre.org/about/index.html
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Initial work Most tools are trivial to adopt into use. SonarQube requires
infrastructure for its server application. Some initial configuration of
desired detection rulesets can be required. Reviewing the findings of
the first analysis run can take a considerable amount of effort if tool is
adopted mid-project.
Continuous work Some continuous work is required for reviewing findings
and managing false positives. The tools must also be kept up to date,
which may require a small amount of periodic work if the tool is not
capable of self-updating.
Security expertise Can be used to a large extent with little to no secu-
rity expertise, as the analysis results produced generally contain good
descriptions of the vulnerabilities the warnings are about. Security ex-
pertise would make results review considerably more efficient, though.
3.2.1 FindSecurityBugs
FindSecurityBugs13 is an open source FindBugs14 extension with a focus on
security issues. It mainly detects potential vulnerabilities in Java code, but
since version 1.2.0 released in October 2013 it has also included detection
sets for Groovy and Scala.
This seems to be the favoured open source tool for static security analysis
in the Java community. It is actively developed.
Integration to development environment should be extremely easy for
projects built with Maven, since it is only available as a plugin for the Find-
Bugs maven plugin. The downside is that for non-Maven projects it is consid-
erably harder. Integration into CI environment should likewise be easy since
the tool’s results are exportable into the xUnit format, which is universally
understood by CI systems. Additionally for Jenkins, the Jenkins FindBugs
plugin15 can be used for presenting the results.
An interesting detail about FindSecurityBugs is that it analyses JVM
bytecode instead of Java source code, and could thus be used for analysing
any JVM-based language.
In addition to CI, FindSecurityBugs also integrates easily into popular
Java IDEs including Eclipse and IntelliJ IDEA, so it could be used to high-
light possible security issues while coding. This should reduce the amount of
issues that are caught and must be dealt with later, in the CI stage.
13http://h3xstream.github.io/find-sec-bugs/
14http://findbugs.sourceforge.net/
15https://wiki.jenkins-ci.org/display/JENKINS/FindBugs+Plugin
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3.2.2 SonarQube
SonarQube16 is a static code analysis platform with support for numerous
programming languages. It involves a server application into which client
applications can send analysis results. The server application provides a web
application interface for reviewing results and configuring the system. As
such, some resources and initial effort is required for setting up the server
application as well as database into which the results should be stored and,
if desired, customizing the analysis rules.
Integration into CI should be simple, as most CI systems have dedicated
client plugins for SonarQube. SonarQube also supports analyzing FindSecu-
rityBugs results, so it could be used for better visualization and analysis of
them.
There was a Security Rules Plugin17 available for older versions of Sonar-
Qube, but latest version of that was released in January 2012 and deprecated
in SonarQube version 4.2. Fortunately, they have started adding security-
related rules to the normal language detection sets in 2015, so recent versions
can do some static security analysis out of the box.
For Java, JavaScript and PHP, the SonarLint18 tool provides basic anal-
ysis without customizable rules via CLI or IDE integration.
Reviewing and managing findings in SonarQube is easy, and it can cal-
culate trends and track issues across multiple analyses.
Good descriptions of the found vulnerability types are provided when
reviewing analysis results, in many cases with examples and instructions on
how to fix the issue, so the tool is usable to large extent without much security
expertise.
3.2.3 Brakeman
Brakeman19 is a static code security scanner for Ruby, focused primarily on
Ruby on Rails. It is open source and available as a Ruby gem, and thus
running it in development or continuous integration environments is easy.
This appears to be the preferred open source tool for Ruby on Rails static
security analysis and at the time of writing is actively developed.
In addition to static code analysis, it does dependency verification at least
for public vulnerabilities in Ruby on Rails.
16http://www.sonarqube.org/
17http://docs.sonarqube.org/display/PLUG/Security+Rules+Plugin
18http://www.sonarlint.org/
19http://brakemanscanner.org/
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Results can be output in multiple human- or machine-readable formats,
but not in any commonly used test result format. Thus, integration into
any CI feedback loop should not prove too difficult, but will likely require
a custom results transformer. There is also a dedicated plugin20 available
for Jenkins that already does this, so if using Jenkins for CI the integration
should be extremely easy.
The tool features an easy-to-use interactive false positive management
mode, through which a configuration file for ignoring false positives can be
created, loaded or modified.
3.2.4 phpcs-security-audit
phpcs-security-audit21 is a security focused new ruleset to the PHP CodeSniffer22
static analysis tool.
Initial setup is easy. PHP Codesniffer is available through PEAR, the
PHP Extension and Application Repository, and phpcs-security-audit is in-
stalled by linking or copying the ruleset files into the PHP Codesniffer in-
stallation directory.
It has general detection rules for possible security issues in core PHP code
and specific sets for Drupals 7-8 and Symfony 2.
Running the tool is simple via a CLI and results are available in multiple
machine-readable formats, so integration into CI systems should not require
much effort.
3.2.5 eslint-config-scanjs
Adapted from ScanJS23, which was a static security analysis tool for JavaScript,
eslint-config-scanjs24 is a security focused ruleset for ESLint25.
Setup is easy and involves installing ESLint, which is available via NPM,
the Node Package Manager, as well as some specific dependencies for eslint-
config-scanjs, which are also available via NPM. After that, the scanjs rules
are specified as a command line parameter for ESLint.
CI integration is easy, since ESLint can generate reports in a general static
analysis XML format. The XML report can then be presented in the CI
20https://wiki.jenkins-ci.org/display/JENKINS/Brakeman+Plugin
21https://github.com/Pheromone/phpcs-security-audit
22https://github.com/squizlabs/PHP_CodeSniffer
23https://github.com/mozilla/scanjs
24https://github.com/mozfreddyb/eslint-config-scanjs
25http://eslint.org/
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system using any static analysis presentation plugin, such as the Checkstyle
plugin for Jenkins.
IDE integration is also possible, at least for IntelliJ IDEs.
3.2.6 JSPrime
JSPrime26 is another static security analysis tool for JavaScript.
Unfortunately, it only offers an analysis interface via the web browser,
and the results are represented as an html page. On cursory examination,
the implementation of the tool is heavily tied into the model of input and
output through html pages. Because of this, logic extraction or refactoring
to enable reasonable CI integration would require a non-trivial amount of
work.
A potentially more viable workaround would be to utilize Selenium or
some such tool to pass input and fetch output from the html page interfaces
of the tool in a CI system.
Overall, JSPrime is not a suitable candidate for continuous testing.
3.3 Configuration checking
Security issues can also result from the misconfiguration of systems or ap-
plications. For instance, production servers of an application most certainly
should not allow remote root login, nor should production databases allow
connections from anywhere but the application servers.
The OWASP Top 10 Web Application Security Risks 2013[26] recognize
security misconfiguration as the 5th most significant risk. Though generic
web vulnerability scanners can be used to detect some security issues result-
ing from application-level misconfiguration, configuration checking is a more
effective detection method [12].
Configuration issues have traditionally been the domain of sysadmins and
sysops, and thus far removed from the actual software development process.
However, with the rise of DevOps and the Infrastructure as Code paradigm
we are able to include the code for automating the provisioning and configura-
tion of infrastructure for a developed application into the same development
process and CI feedback loop as the actual application we are developing.
We are able to use infrastructure and deployment automation tools such
26https://github.com/dpnishant/jsprime
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as Chef27, Ansible28 and Capistrano29 to develop and automatically deploy
the whole technology stack of our application. With that capability, we can
bring up new instances from scratch for each change, and run configuration
checking tools on the end result to verify that our web servers, firewalls etc
are securely configured.
Since the tools for configuration checking are non-invasive and require
little processing power and resources, they can also be run on production
machines. This is especially useful if it is not feasible to provision new ma-
chines on which to run configuration checking tools in the CI process.
In addition to checking the configurations of individual applications, it is
also possible to check and enforce security policies. Security policy compli-
ance checking could be a useful continuous security testing method in cloud
environments where virtual machines are created and destroyed continuously.
In such a scenario, we could conceivably check at regular intervals that each
running machine conforms to our defined security policy to detect intrusions.
It would also be relatively simple to also enforce the security policy by shut-
ting down every non-compliant machine when detected.
Analysis of the characteristics laid out at the start of this chapter:
Workflow integration Easy to trigger from CI, but no ready solutions for
representing results in CI.
Initial work No effort required for setting up since the tools are just scripts
or standalone binaries. Some effort is needed to implement custom
results parsing into some format that a CI system can present and
track.
Continuous work Very little continuous work, as the results can mostly be
interpreted into pass/fail cases. The tools should be kept up to date,
but that also requires very little work.
Security expertise Some security expertise can be required to accurately
determine remedial actions for some warnings. Many of the checks are
straightforward and fixable even without security expertise, though.
3.3.1 Lynis
Lynis30 is an open source auditing and hardening tool for Unix/Linux based
systems. It provides security-related feedback on system components and
27https://www.getchef.com/chef/
28http://www.ansible.com/
29http://capistranorb.com/
30http://cisofy.com/lynis/
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configuration, such as user accounts, groups, shells and such.
There is also a commercial enterprise version available, with added au-
tomation, reporting and hardening information features.
Running is easy via CLI, and results are produced in a machine-readable
structured text format. Integration into CI feedback loop should pose no
problem, but will require implementing a parser for automated processing of
the results.
3.3.2 MySQLTuner
MySQLTuner31 is a configuration checking script for improving MySQL per-
formance and stability. It also has a section on security, although that only
contains a check that no passwordless users exist.
Nevertheless, database performance and stability issues can also cascade
into security issues. For example, a misconfigured database can allow an
attacker to overload itself, opening up a vector for a Denial of Service attack.
This tool is run via CLI and provides output in a structured text format
that is machine-readable, so integration into a CI feedback loop should be
relatively simple but would require implementing a custom parser.
3.3.3 SSLyze
SSLyze32 is a tool for identifying SSL misconfigurations in a server by con-
necting to it.
Running the tool is easy via its CLI and results output is available in
machine-readable plaintext and XML. Some of the checks done by the tool
produce a pass/fail result that could easily be used in a CI system, but most
parts of the results require further analysis to determine if they are security
issues.
With some parsing and results processing code it could be used in CI to
validate the sanity of SSL configurations and absence of critical vulnerabili-
ties such as heartbleed33.
3.3.4 unix-privesc-check
unix-privesc-check34 is a tool that checks for misconfigurations that could
lead to escalation of privileges.
31http://mysqltuner.com/
32https://github.com/iSECPartners/sslyze
33http://heartbleed.com/
34http://pentestmonkey.net/tools/audit/unix-privesc-check
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It is a shell script with dependencies to a few system tools, and as such
easy to trigger in CI. The output is in structured plaintext, so it can be
interpreted with simple parsing rules.
3.3.5 Linux Security Auditing Tool
Linux Security Auditing Tool (LSAT)35 is another tool for detecting system-
level misconfigurations that can result in vulnerabilities.
The tool comprises of 37 small modules, which in total generate 66 small
reports on various aspects of the system. The format of the reports un-
fortunately varies so much that most would require separate result parsing
logic for meaningful usage in continuous testing. Additionally, the output of
many modules requires case-by-case interpretation and cannot be automati-
cally parsed by the CI system as an issue or not.
While the required effort of writing separate parsing logic for each report
format can make this tool unsuitable in many cases, some subset of the
reports could also be chosen to utilize the checks deemed most useful with
considerably less effort.
3.3.6 Security monkey
Security monkey36 is a tool that monitors the policies and configurations in
an AWS account. It is intended for alerting about insecure configurations.
This is a standalone application and does not currently integrate into any
CI system. It also requires quite a bit of setup and configuration effort to
get started.
While security monkey only generates warnings, it would be easy to adapt
into a tool that enforced the given security rules and policies by immediately
shutting down non-conforming instances.
3.4 Security verification
Most security testing tools, like vulnerability scanners and static code anal-
ysers, can only act as ”badness-ometers” in that their results only tell you
where you are on the range from ”deep trouble” to ”who knows” [17]. Even if
they find no issues, you still do not know if your software is secure. Security
verification tools aim to provide a way of specifying security requirements for
an application and then testing that it adheres to all of them.
35http://usat.sourceforge.net/
36https://github.com/Netflix/security_monkey
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Ideally, security verification tools could be used to codify the security
requirements of an application and verify them continually during develop-
ment. They could also be used for writing regression tests for found and
fixed vulnerabilities to prevent them from quietly re-surfacing.
All of the three tools we found take the behavior-driven development
(BDD) approach to security testing.
A drawback of these tools is that they require a relatively large amount
of security expertise from the organization, since the verification tests need
to be created specifically for each application. A good understanding of both
the security requirements of each application and how to test them is needed.
Another thing to consider with tools of this type is that they rely on
other, more specialized tools like nmap37 or sslyze to do the actual testing,
and thus require the availability of multiple tools in addition to themselves
for meaningful use.
In addition to continuous testing during development, security verification
tools can also be used for verifying that production instances of applications
adhere to the security requirements codified in their tests.
Analysis of the characteristics laid out at the start of this chapter:
Workflow integration Very easy to trigger from CI, results presentable
and trackable across builds using existing CI functionality.
Initial work A little effort is required for installing the framework and de-
sired tools it leverages. Considerable effort can be required to write
necessary test cases, but one can also start with just a few and add
more continuously.
Continuous work Some continuous work is required for writing more test
cases as the software develops. A little work is also required for keeping
the framework and leveraged tools up to date. Very little effort required
for reviewing test results.
Security expertise Considerable security expertise can be required for writ-
ing good test cases. Little to no expertise is required for reviewing the
test results.
3.4.1 Gauntlt
Gauntlt38 is a security testing framework that provides a DSL to write tests
utilizing tools like nmap. This means it can be used to write basic security
37http://nmap.org/
38http://gauntlt.org/
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verification tests, like what ports should or should not be open on a server.
This tool is available as a Ruby gem, so installation and running in de-
velopment and CI environments should be relatively simple.
Gauntlt uses cucumber39 and its gherkin40 syntax for writing and running
tests.
Integration into CI feedback loop should also be easy, and the results are
available in a machine-readable text format. Cucumber is also able to export
results into JUnit format, but doing so via gauntlt is currently (March 2016)
broken. It can be fixed with a minor patch to gauntlt code, though, and
there is an open issue concerning it. So either patching gauntlt or writing a
custom parser is required if automated results parsing is desired on a finer
grain than the exit code of the tool.
3.4.2 BDD-security
BDD-security41 is another framework for testing the security requirements of
an application.
The tool is written in Java and uses JBehave42 as its test framework.
A promising aspect of this tool is that it separates the security require-
ment definitions from the application-specific logic needed to test them. Some
basic scenarios based on common security requirements, such as authentica-
tion and session management, are even included in the tool.
This could be an advantage especially in larger organizations, since secu-
rity experts could conceivably craft common security requirements and test
scenario descriptions based on them, and software developers could re-use
the same tests in various projects just by implementing the functionality of
application-specific key words like ”login”.
BDD-security provides a convenient CLI for automation, and using plu-
gins the results are exportable to a unit test format so CI integration should
be easy.
3.4.3 Mittn
Mittn43 is a recent addition to the group of security verification frameworks.
Like Gauntlt, it provides a way of writing security assurance tests in human-
39http://cukes.info/
40http://cukes.info/gherkin.html
41http://www.continuumsecurity.net/bdd-intro.html
42http://jbehave.org/
43https://github.com/F-Secure/mittn
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readable language, leveraging existing tools like SSLyze and Radamsa to do
the actual testing.
It is written in Python and uses behave44 as its BDD framework.
It differs from the other two security verification frameworks in that it
saves test results into a PostgreSQL database. Storing the results into a
database allows for different ways of handling the test results, which can
be advantageous. For example, false positive management is done via the
database.
Triggering the tool via CLI in CI is easy, and the results are exportable
to a unit test format so presenting them in CI should not pose a problem.
3.5 Dependency verification
Since practically all modern applications make use of third party libraries,
be they free/open source or proprietary, the risk of security vulnerabilities
resulting from included dependencies is a growing concern. This concern
seems justified as included dependencies account for some 80% of the code
in modern applications. The seriousness of this issue is also evidenced by
a study concluding that in 26% of cases, libraries downloaded from Maven
central contain publicly disclosed vulnerabilities.[30]
OWASP has also noted this issue in their ”The Top 10 Most Critical Web
Application Security Risks 2013” listing by including ”Using components
with Known Vulnerabilities” as a new category in the Top 10. The listing’s
release notes state regarding it [27]:
”This issue was mentioned as part of 2010-A6 — Security Mis-
configuration, but now has a category of its own as the growth
and depth of component based development has significantly in-
creased the risk of using components with known vulnerabilities”
As such, it makes sense to try to verify that the third party libraries
included as dependencies contain no known security vulnerabilities. For this
purpose, various dependency verification tools have emerged.
Dependency verification tools do not perform any active analysis. Instead,
they only check if the tool’s vulnerability database contains any known vul-
nerabilities in the versions of dependencies used by the application under
scrutiny. Because of this, the processing overhead involved in using these
tools tends to be quite small.
44http://pythonhosted.org/behave/
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While these tools can produce false positives, it does not happen often
and requires either misidentification of a library or a false vulnerability entry
in the vulnerability database utilized by the tool.
For many of these tools, the vulnerability database is an online one. This
needs to be taken into account when planning tool usage in a CI system,
as some environments might not allow traffic from the CI server to public
internet. An upside to this is that these tools often automatically update
their local copy of the vulnerability database, or at least make automating
the update extremely easy.
Some of these tools can also be run in production environments, and as
such could be used to signal a higher priority alert if a vulnerable dependency
is detected in production.
These tools share a disadvantage with static security analysers: both are
language-specific, and as such, dependency verification tools mainly exist for
established programming languages with widely used dependency manage-
ment systems.
Another note-worthy aspect of these tools is that their usefulness is heav-
ily dependent on the vulnerability database they use. Tools using more
actively maintained vulnerability databases are of course more useful. The
vulnerability databases generally contain a mapping from specific library ver-
sions to publicly disclosed CVE entries.
In addition to checking dependencies for publicly disclosed vulnerabilities,
there are tools for adding checksum verification to dependency management
systems missing such a feature. This offers a way to prevent MitM attacks.
It is also possible to check if the installed operating system level packages
contain known vulnerabilities or have pending security updates to install with
tools such as debsecan45.
Analysis of the characteristics laid out at the start of this chapter:
Workflow integration Easy to trigger from CI. Output of tools can be
interpreted as a ”pass/fail” or ”number of warnings” result in CI with
a little effort.
Initial work Tools are trivial to adopt into use. A little initial effort is
required for meaningful results presentation in a CI system.
Continuous work Basically no effort required for reviewing results. If tool
or vulnerability database updates are required, they are trivially au-
tomatable.
Security expertise No security expertise required.
45http://www.enyo.de/fw/software/debsecan/
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3.5.1 Bundler-audit
Bundler-audit46 is a Ruby gem that does patch-level verification for gems
declared as dependencies.
Running it in development or CI environments is easy, and while the
output is provided only as text, it is structured in such a way that integration
into CI feedback loop should not prove too much work.
It uses the ruby-advisory-db47 project as its vulnerability database and
provides an easy mechanism for updating the local copy, so keeping the vul-
nerability detection set up to date is extremely easy to automate.
Ignoring some advisories is possible by passing arguments to the tool
invocation on CLI.
Triggering the tool via CLI in CI is easy, and the results are provided
in a machine-readable text format so only a bit of parsing is required for
rudimentary integration of the results into the CI feedback loop.
3.5.2 HolePicker
Like bundler-audit, HolePicker48 checks the Ruby gems declared as depen-
dencies of an application for known vulnerabilities.
Although the development road map of the tool includes switching to
use ruby-advisory-db for vulnerability data, the latest version uses a self-
maintained database. Based on a cursory examination, the database seems
extremely limited in comparison to ruby-advisory-db, so the usefulness of
this tool will be enhanced once the switch is implemented.
Like with Bundler-audit, running is easy in both development and CI.
Output is likewise provided as structured text, and can thus be integrated
into CI feedback loop with a small effort.
One interesting feature of this tool is the ability to scan dependencies
of all applications served by a given web server instance by pointing the
tool at apache/nginx configs. HolePicker can also easily integrate into the
application deployment tool Capistrano, and so could be used to perform a
dependency vulnerability check automatically before each deployment.
Unfortunately, development of the tool was discontinued in fall 2014. The
online database has been disabled since then, and a new maintainer has not
been found. As such, the tool cannot be used.
46https://github.com/rubysec/bundler-audit
47https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db
48https://github.com/jsuder/holepicker
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3.5.3 Dawnscanner
Dawnscanner49 is a static web application code security scanner for Ruby. It
is targeted specifically for use with the popular frameworks Ruby on Rails,
Sinatra and Padrino. It checks the framework, Ruby version and declared
dependencies for vulnerabilities against it’s own vulnerability database, but
also contains some static code analysis functionality for finding SQL injection
and XSS vulnerabilities in code.
It is available as a Ruby gem with a convenient CLI so running should
be easy both in CI and on developers’ machines. Results are output in
a structured plaintext format, so it should be relatively easy to parse for
processing in CI.
It is actively developed at the time of writing in March 2016, with the
focus of future development in improving its static code analysis features.
3.5.4 OWASP Dependency Check
OWASP Dependency Check50 checks a Java or .NET application’s depen-
dencies for publicly known vulnerabilities.
Integration into a any CI system should be easy, since a CLI exists, as
well as separate plugins for the popular Java build tools Maven and Ant. An
actively maintained Jenkins-plugin is also available.
It has a mechanism for managing false positives by specifying the warnings
to ignore in an XML file, and the XML block to suppress a given warning
can be automatically generated from the tool’s report page. Thus, not much
continuous overhead should result from management of false positives.
It relies on National Vulnerability Database (NVD) feeds provided by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for vulnerability
data. The tool automatically keeps itself up-to-date using the feeds. The
documentation states that the initial complete download of vulnerability data
can take more than 15 minutes, which can be too long for continuous testing
in some cases. However, if the tool is run at least once every 7 days, it will
only require downloading a small update file.
49https://github.com/thesp0nge/dawnscanner
50https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Dependency_Check
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3.5.5 pliers-npm-security-check
Pliers-npm-security-check51 is a tool for checking dependency npm packages
for publicly disclosed vulnerabilities for the pliers52 JavaScript build tool.
It uses the nodesecurity.io validation REST api to do the actual vulner-
ability checking.
Installation is easy, as is triggering the tool in CI via either the command
line or a pliers task. The results are output in machine-readable plaintext, so
presenting them in CI requires some simple parsing logic to be implemented.
3.5.6 nsp
Nsp53 is the nodesecurity project’s54 tool for checking npm dependencies
against their vulnerability database.
Installation via npm is simple for both CI and developer machine envi-
ronments, and the tool is run via simple CLI. Results are ouput in a machine-
readable plaintext format, so rudimentary CI integration of results is easy
with a bit of parsing.
Nsp can also be easily triggered via the popular JavaScript task runner
Grunt55 by using a grunt plugin available via npm.
3.5.7 SensioLabs Security Advisories Checker
SensioLabs Security Advisories Checker56 checks for known vulnerabilities
in the dependencies of PHP projects that use Composer57 for dependency
management.
It utilizes an online security advisory database maintained by SensioLabs,
so no user actions are required to keep advisories up-to-date.
It is usable via CLI, so triggering in a CI system is easy. Results are
output in either JSON or machine-readable plaintext, so integrating them
back to the CI feedback loop can be achieved with a bit of parsing logic.
51https://www.npmjs.org/package/pliers-npm-security-check
52https://github.com/pliersjs/pliers
53https://github.com/nodesecurity/nsp
54http://nodesecurity.io
55http://gruntjs.com/
56https://github.com/sensiolabs/security-checker
57https://getcomposer.org/
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3.5.8 Versions Maven Plugin
While not a security testing tool as such, the Versions Maven Plugin58 can
be used to check if there are updates available for any of the dependencies
declared for a project that uses maven for dependency management.
Considering that many years old versions of libraries and frameworks that
contain publicly disclosed vulnerabilities are still downloaded in considerable
amounts[30] by dependency management systems, using a tool such as this
sounds prudent.
Running this tool in the CI cycle of a maven project should be extremely
easy. Handling the results would require some work, though, as human review
and potential dependency update would probably be wanted each time it
detects out-of-date dependencies. Some processing of the results might also
be wanted, for example to ignore some dependencies when checking for new
versions if the specific dependency could not be updated for some reason.
A potential limitation of this tool is that running the checks for a project
with many dependencies can take a while because the tool checks for available
versions for each dependency from each configured maven repository one at
a time.
The tool also provides a way to ignore available updates in selected de-
pendencies, or restrict the considered version range, which can be useful if
upgrade into a new major version, for example, is not feasible. The mecha-
nism works by specifying rules for handling versions in an XML file.
The tool’s output format is structured plaintext, so some parsing would
be required for automated analysis of results. It claims to also have the
capability to output the results in a report format of some sort, but at least
in version 2.1 this functionality was broken.
3.5.9 Retire.js
Retire.js59 is a tool for identifying JavaScript libraries with known vulnerabili-
ties. A grunt plugin, grunt-retire60, also exists, allowing for easier automation
in projects that use grunt.
No method of managing false positives is provided, but it is possible to
ignore some paths completely, which might in some cases be usable for the
same purpose.
The tool’s output format is structured plaintext, so some parsing is re-
quired for automated analysis and presentation of results.
58http://mojo.codehaus.org/versions-maven-plugin
59https://github.com/bekk/retire.js
60https://www.npmjs.org/package/grunt-retire
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Retire.js is also available as a chrome or firefox extension, and could be
used to check frontends for use of vulnerable libraries even without access to
the development process. Such checking could conceivably be automated us-
ing Selenium or some other browser automation tool. This could prove useful
for gathering overall vulnerability status for example when developing only
a part of a larger site made up of interconnected web applications developed
by different companies.
3.5.10 Gradle witness
Maven Central61, the main distribution channel of dependency libraries for
JVM languages, does not by default provide download access to the depen-
dencies over SSL. This opens the clients using dependency managers such
as maven, gradle62, SBT63 or leiningen64 up for Man-in-the-Middle (MitM)
attacks.[29]
Gradle witness65 is tool for verifying that the checksums of downloaded
dependencies match those expected, thus preventing MitM backdooring of
them.
Using this tool requires adding the checksum of a dependency library
into the dependency manifest each time a new dependency is added. The
tool includes a feature for easily generating and adding the checksums of all
currently declared libraries, so it should be easy to adopt if one is willing to
trust the authenticity of their currently downloaded dependencies.
The tool integrates itself into the gradle dependency manager, so after
installing it will automatically run every time dependencies are fetched. The
installation process itself is not as simple as adding a dependency, but still
relatively simple and should not pose a problem. Presumably, the tool will
cause dependency resolving to fail if checksums do not match. For meaning-
ful use and presentation in CI, some logic would be needed to differentiate
failures caused by this tool from other failures and highlight them as such.
3.6 Summary
At the start of this chapter, we recognized the following high-level charac-
teristics of security testing methods and tools to affect the suitability for
61http://central.sonatype.org/
62http://www.gradle.org/
63http://www.scala-sbt.org/
64http://leiningen.org/
65https://github.com/whispersystems/gradle-witness
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continuous testing:
• Ease of integration into the development workflow
• Initial work required for meaningful results
• Continuous work required alongside software development
• Security expertise required for meaningful use of the tool
To determine more specifically which aspects of a security testing method
or tool most affect the above characteristics, we reviewed publications on
the selected security testing methods and the documentation of 29 security
testing tools representative of the methods. A simplified overview of each
covered method’s suitability for continuous security testing, based on the
analysis, is presented in table 3.6. We found the following more specific
factors to most affect the suitability of a security testing method or tool for
continuous testing:
• The infrastructure required by the tool affects the amount of initial
work required. Vulnerability scanners can require multiple nodes for
scanning and corresponding capacity for the system under test to be
able to handle all the scanning traffic, whereas dependency verification
tools require very little resources.
• The time it takes to run the tool has an effect on development workflow
integration. If it takes hours for a single run, the tool is probably
unsuitable for running after each build in a CI system to get immediate
feedback. In such a case, nightly runs may be a practical alternative.
• Human effort required in reading reports and verifying findings largely
affects the continuous work required. Especially for small development
teams it is often not feasible to spend much time reviewing reports.
• Tool maintenance and setup costs in effort and money affect both the
initial and continuous work required. Larger organizations may be able
to spread these costs over multiple projects, while smaller organizations
may not be able to spend much effort or money on the tool.
• Available tools and processes for managing false positives and duplicate
reports can greatly affect the continuous work required. Handling false
positives and duplicate reports can cause considerable overhead in even
non-continuous security testing processes, and continuousness of the
testing can only make this problem worse. As such, effective tools
and processes for handling the false positives and duplicate reports are
essential.
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Workflow
integration
effort
Initial
work
Continuous
work
Security
expertise
required
Vulnerability
scanning difficult high medium medium
Static
vulnerability
analysis very easy low medium medium
Configuration
checking easy low low low
Security
verification very easy high medium high
Dependency
verification easy very low very low low
Table 3.1: Analysis of security testing method characteristics that determine
suitability for continuous security testing
• Required security expertise is largely dependent on testing method.
The results of most of the covered tools can be reviewed to a large ex-
tent with little or no security expertise. Considerable expertise can be
required for initial testing configuration or setup beyond installing the
tool, however. For example, utilizing vulnerability scanners with cus-
tomized scan profiles or security verification tools with custom-written
tests specifically targeting the application at hand can require a con-
siderable amount of security expertise. On the other hand, dependency
verification tools do not require any security expertise to use.
Chapter 4
Security testing methods in con-
tinuous integration
In this chapter, we present methods of and challenges in adopting security
testing into CI systems and development workflows. We first go through some
general guidelines and issues related to work management, tool adoption,
testing and results handling that apply for adopting any of the reviewed
security testing methods into a CI process, and then review the case for each
method separately.
4.1 General guidelines
In ”Secure Programming with Static Analysis”, Chess and West[10] state
that three questions need to be answered for a software development orga-
nization to adopt a security testing tool successfully. Though the book only
deals with static analysis, the questions are general enough to apply to all
security testing tools. The three questions are:
• Who runs the tool?
• When is the tool run?
• What happens to the results?
In the case of continuous security testing, the answers to the first two
questions are largely fixed.
The ”who” is the CI system, and by extension the developers. For even
faster feedback cycles, in cases where it is feasible, developers should also be
able to run the tools in their development environments. Chess and West[10]
propose having developers run the tools in a mode that only produces high-
confidence results and leaving more thorough reviews to be done by security
40
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experts. This is a great option for cases where security expert support is
available, and may be a sensible choice in many cases even if such support is
not available.
The ”when” depends somewhat on the security testing methods and tools
selected. For truly continuous security testing the acceptable range would
be from ”continually in developers’ IDEs”, through ”once for each commit
in the CI system”, to ”nightly test runs in the CI system” for the most time-
consuming tests, the preference being for the former end of the spectrum.
For the last question, no single answer exists. How the results of contin-
uous security testing can best be processed depends on the case, with the
selected security testing methods and tools affecting the feasibility of different
results processing options.
4.1.1 Work management
All work involved must be made visible by going through the normal work
management process. This goes for initial planning and setup required for
tool adoption, as well as for any continuous work required for results process-
ing and fixing found issues. The aim is to ensure that all stakeholders are
aware that security requires real effort, and thus make sure that adequate
resources are allocated to have a reasonable chance of success.
Adopting certain tools involves initial costs in the form of infrastructure
setup. It is a good idea to try to spread these costs across projects/teams.
In many cases, the same tool installation can be used for multiple projects
or teams. In cases where sharing a tool instance is not feasible, the setup
can be automated using modern infrastructure automation and configuration
management tools to avoid duplicate work.
4.1.2 Tool adoption
It is important to select security testing methods and tools that are suited
to the case at hand. Many security testing tools are good at catching certain
types of vulnerabilities, and some tools are even designed for detecting vul-
nerabilities in a specific framework or application. Selecting the most suitable
tool will lead to more valuable results. Higher perceived value of the security
testing in turn increases the chances that the team will take ownership of it.
It is a good idea to start small, as Chess and West recommend[10]. Es-
pecially when adopting a security testing tool mid-project the first results
can be overwhelming and lead to developer apathy towards security testing
if not managed properly. A good adoption process only enables a few, easily
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understood vulnerability checks at the beginning, and increases the amount
of tests and tools gradually at a pace that’s comfortable for the developers.
Security and tool training for developers is a good idea. Both general
security expertise and knowledge on the specific security testing tools im-
prove developer efficiency when reviewing testing results. The same goes for
accuracy when deciding what actions the results necessitate. Additionally,
by improving the value gained by using the tools, continuous security testing
adoption success chances are improved.
4.1.3 Tool maintenance
A strategy for keeping the security testing tool up to date is needed. Static
analysis tools for instance often add new detection sets in tool updates. In
many cases, this can and should be automated.
Monitoring the maintenance state of selected tools to notice if their de-
velopment or maintenance stagnates is also important, especially for utilized
open source tools. Continuing to use an abandoned tool can lead to a false
sense of security, so using one should always be a conscious decision.
4.1.4 Test targeting
CI systems are normally used to run tests for development and release candi-
date versions of the developed software. However, security tests are different
from other kinds of testing in that new vulnerabilities can be found after se-
curity testing tool or database updates. Therefore, to prevent security issues
that have already been fixed in development or release candidate versions
from secretly persisting in production, the current production version should
also be regularly security tested if deployments are not done daily.
It is not enough to run security tests for each commit when developing
the software. Vulnerabilities in the technologies and third party libraries can
surface years after the application has entered maintenance mode. Security
testing tool updates and periodic security tests should continue also after
active development has ended, for the whole lifecycle of the application.
4.1.5 Results handling
A system for efficiently managing the results of tools in continuous use is
essential. The two major issues that must be solved are ignoring false posi-
tives, and tracking findings across test runs. Most of the currently available
tools are intended for manual one-off use, and so they rarely include any
mechanism for keeping track of and managing findings across multiple runs.
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If security experts are available, a good process to at least start with
for handling the results of security tests would be to utilize a security ex-
pert - developer pair for both verifying and fixing found issues. In addition
to ensuring the accuracy of issue verification and fixes, it would also help
disseminate security expertise among the developers.
In most cases, it would be possible to integrate the handling of the secu-
rity testing results into the normal development workflow by automatically
creating a new issue in an issue tracker for each finding by the CI system.
The process of verifying and handling the issues would then proceed from
there like any other work. Involving an issue tracking system can cause con-
siderable overhead, though, according to a study by Baca et al.[5], and can
severely lengthen the processing time for findings.
Another, lighter-weight approach to development workflow integration is
to utilize pull request reviews for processing the security testing results. This
approach is suitable to most modern development processes, since develop-
ment through feature branches and pull requests is the de-facto standard
practice. The security testing results can be posted either as comments to
the pull request or as separate test case statuses by the CI system. This
approach is mainly useful for preventing regressions by limiting the analysed
results to the set of differences between the feature branch and the master
branch. The drawback is that some other approach is required for handling
possible baseline issues.
The way that the security testing results factor into the build status of the
whole application needs to be determined based on the security requirements
of application. In some cases, even a potential finding can be grounds to
prevent deployment to production, while in others it can be desirable to
deploy even with verified vulnerabilities.
4.2 Vulnerability scanning
While continuous vulnerability scanning can be an effective tool for improv-
ing the security of software during development, the technical and process
integration of the scanners into a project’s CI loop is not trivial.
Vulnerability scanners require infrastructure to be set up for both the
scanner and the target to be scanned. The effort involved can make this
approach to continuous security testing unfeasible, especially in cases where
infrastructure and application deployment automation is not yet utilized.
On the other hand, if the project adheres to the Infrastructure as Code
principle and has an automated mechanism for deploying the application,
the setup of the target application should be almost effortless. Additionally
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the infrastructure setup of the scanner can be automated, and as such, the
work effort costs associated with it can be spread across many teams and/or
projects.
In most cases, the actual application’s infrastructure setup automation
is more important than that of the scanner. This is because there should
not be a need to redeploy the scanner after initial setup. In contrast, the
test instance of the developed application will need constant updating as
the application and associated infrastructure are developed further. Even
complete redeploys from scratch may be needed, for example if an aggressive
scan breaks the application irreversibly.
For the most thorough results, it is important to keep the scanner up-
dated to the latest available version, as new detection capabilities and im-
provements to existing ones are often added via tool updates.
While vulnerability scanning in CI is the most feasible approach to con-
tinuousness, using these tools in development environments is possible es-
pecially if the project adheres to the IaC principle and virtualization can
be leveraged. However, since vulnerability scanning can require a consider-
able amount of computing resources for both the scanner and the scanned
application, it might be prohibitively slow to do on developers’ machines.
The computing resource requirements of vulnerability scanning are also
an issue from the continuous security testing perspective, as scans can easily
take hours of time. Factors that affect the time taken are the attack surface
of the target application, whether or not the scan profile has been crafted
to fit the target application, and the infrastructure and resources given to
both the scanner and the target instance of the application. While it may
be possible to get the scanning times short enough to enable true continuous
testing with enough effort and resources, it is probably not feasible in most
cases. A practical alternative is to run vulnerability scans at reasonably
frequent intervals, for example nightly.
An opportunity for automatically creating comprehensive attack vector
maps specifically targeted at the application under scan is presented by mod-
ern web application testing automation tools such as Selenium1. Some scan-
ners feature an active scanning mode as an alternative to using a crawler to
map attack vectors. While the active scanning mode is intended to be used
with a user manually browsing the target web application, it could also be
combined with existing web application tests. This way a customized attack
vector map for the application could be effortlessly created without time-
consuming and potentially error-prone blind crawling. As web application
tests are a common practice in modern software development, this approach
1http://www.seleniumhq.org/
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should be applicable in most cases.
While vulnerability scanners can be operated without much security ex-
pertise by simply using a default comprehensive scan profile that runs tests
against all possible vulnerabilities that the scanner can detect, this is in most
cases very inefficient and time-consuming. To better utilize the scanner, some
security expertise is required to create a scan profile that only tests for the
vulnerability types that are relevant to the target application.
Once the technical integration work to get the vulnerability scanner up
and running in CI is done, a process for dealing with the results is needed.
Since vulnerability scanning results always require manual verification, some
continuous effort for verification should be reserved. Security expertise might
also be needed in many cases to correctly and efficiently verify the vulnera-
bilities reported.
The high-level variables for a results processing strategy are:
• Continuousness of results verification
• Continuousness of fixing verified issues
• Who does the verification
• Who does the fixing
To get the greatest benefit out of continuous security testing, the pref-
erence would be to do both results verification and fixing of verified issues
continuously, immediately following each scan. Additionally, since security
experts are not necessarily always available, it would be best if developers
could do the verification and fixes. However, that is probably not a realis-
tic model for most cases, especially considering that developers are not very
good at detecting false positives from among security issues[6].
A more widely applicable approach would be to split the security testing,
including results handling, into two complementary parts. First, a minimal
scan profile for detecting only critical high-confidence issues could be run for
each commit in CI, if the scan duration can be gotten short enough. The
results of these scans should then be verifiable by the developers immediately
without security expert support. For the verified findings, fixes should be
implemented immediately, as the issues should all be critical.
The second part of the process would be to have a less frequent, for ex-
ample nightly, more comprehensive scan. The results of this scan would be
verified preferably with security expert support, or even just by security ex-
perts. A reasonably continuous verification frequency could range from daily
to weekly. The verified issues would then be prioritized and fixed through the
normal work management process. Developers would implement the fixes,
preferably with security expert support on more obscure issues.
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One major issue for the continuous use of vulnerability scanning tools
is that most of them lack a method for reviewing and managing findings
across successive scans. Since the findings cannot reasonably be mapped to
a unit test like pass/fail format, the core CI functionality cannot be used for
cross-scan issue tracking either. Of the vulnerability scanners investigated in
chapter 3, only Arachni featured a mechanism tracking findings across scans.
This suggests that most vulnerability scanners need an external solution.
4.3 Static vulnerability analysis
The technical integration of static vulnerability analysis into CI is easy and
straightforward, as the existing good tooling and best-practices of general-
purpose static analysis in CI can be used as-is. For an even shorter feedback
loop during development, static vulnerability analysis can also easily be in-
tegrated into development environments using existing IDE plugins or by
implementing a version control pre-commit hook. A third possibility for de-
velopment processes that utilize code reviews via pull requests is to have the
CI system run the tools for PRs and post the results to the PR as comments.
For example, pronto2 or SonarQube via its Github plugin3 can be used for
this.
A challenge for both successful tool adoption and continuous use is that
static analysis can produce considerable amounts of false positives[31]. A
high false positive production rate undermines the credibility and perceived
usefulness of the testing. It can even cause developers to stop taking the
warnings seriously and lead to abandoning the tool entirely. A further risk is
introduced by the fact that developers are bad at identifying false positives
from among findings[6]. If a false positive is mistaken for a valid finding,
developers can even introduce a real vulnerability while trying to fix the
non-existent one[5].
It is therefore essential to select a tool that produces few false positives
and enables efficient handling of the ones it does produce. Tool configuration
and analysis profile customization can further be used to lower the false pos-
itive production rate. The general guideline of starting small is an especially
good idea in the case of static analysis, as adoption can be considerably easier
if only some easy-to-understand high-confidence detection sets are enabled
in the beginning.
Static analysis can also be difficult to successfully adopt in the middle of a
project, since in that case, the initial run can produce a considerable amount
2https://github.com/mmozuras/pronto
3http://docs.sonarqube.org/display/PLUG/GitHub+Plugin
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of findings. This can feel overwhelming and lead to apathy on part of the
developers. In contrast, if adopted at the start of a project, the findings will
trickle in small amounts and are much easier to manage. This means that
when adopting static analysis at the start of a project, it is easier to commit
to immediately verifying all findings and fixing those that are valid. When
adopting in the middle of a project, a strategy for successfully dealing with
the initial results is required.
One such strategy is to treat the initial findings as a baseline, and only
commit to continuously processing new findings. The baseline findings can
then be handled in several ways. One is to whittle them down a bit at a time
whenever individual developers have some slack time. Another is to take on
greater batches in concentrated efforts by the whole team or a part of it.
Alternatively, a team member or external security expert can be dedicated
to the task of going through all the baseline findings.
Another possible strategy is be to consider the total findings of both the
baseline and new findings, but just track the delta between analysis runs and
commit to steadily keeping a downwards trend.
Aside from the special case of how to handle overwhelming amounts of
initial findings from a mid-project initial analysis, the general results process-
ing strategies for static vulnerability analysis are largely the same the ones
presented in section 4.2 for vulnerability scanning. Both methods produce
findings that may be false positives and thus require manual verification, and
that are characterized by a severity/confidence level. The main differences
between the two methods are that static analysis is much faster to perform,
and that effective mechanisms for false positive management and tracking
findings across test runs exist for static analysis tools.
The speed of static analysis means that, in contrast to vulnerability scan-
ning, a comprehensive analysis can be performed for each commit by the
CI system. Nevertheless, the most reasonable results processing strategy is
basically the same as the one outlined for vulnerability scanning. As the first
part, have developers continuously verify and fix easy-to-understand high-
confidence findings. Secondly, perform more comprehensive scans in CI less
continuously, with their results verified by security experts with or without
developers. Developers can fix the straightforward issues themselves, but for
the more obscure ones a security expert should support the fixing developer.
4.4 Configuration checking
As configuration checking tools are extremely simple in their application,
triggering one from a CI system is easy. In most cases, no installation is
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required, just making the binary executable of the tool available on the CI
server and pointing it toward your configuration file is enough.
In order to have the configuration files in CI, they must be programmat-
ically generated. Therefore, the project needs to follow the IaC paradigm.
Configuration checking is also doable in development environments by
utilizing virtual machines into which the environment is provisioned before
doing the actual checks. For this purpose, light-weight virtualization options
such as lxc4 or Docker5 would probably be most useful.
Interpreting and presenting the results of the tools in the CI system re-
quires some work, though, as these tools have been created with manual use
in mind so the output formats are mainly structured plaintext. Thus, parsing
logic for the output is required for meaningful presentation of results in CI.
The simplest form of parsing and presenting the results would be to re-
duce the output of a tool into a binary pass/fail. This could be done with
little effort for any threshold value of issues found. The amount of issues
found should also be relatively easy to parse and represent in CI status and
dashboard views.
More intelligent handling of the results, such as tracking the status of
individual issues across successive runs, is possible by implementing custom
logic into the results parser to uniquely identify the individual issues that
the tool checks for, and translating these into some form that the CI system
understands. For example, each check could be interpreted and represented
as a unit test in the CI system. This way, the core functionality of the CI
system could be leveraged to track the status of the check across successive
runs of the tool. Such an approach is possible for configuration checking tools
as they always check for the same issues and produce a status for each issue
on every run.
4.5 Security verification
Security verification frameworks are by design easily usable in CI. They are
easy to trigger and produce results in formats natively understood by CI
systems. The results require no interpretation or verification, so they are
simple to translate into a build status.
Development environment integration is also feasible, but has a couple of
prerequisites. First, a functioning test instance of the developed application
needs to be accessible. This can be a development instance served from inside
4https://linuxcontainers.org/
5https://www.docker.com/
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a virtual machine, for example. Secondly, depending on the written tests,
installation of leveraged security testing tools is needed.
If testing in a development environment against a development instance,
not all of the security verification tests might be meaningful to run. For
instance, SSL configuration checks of a development instance are a waste of
time unless the webserver configuration is done identically to production via
IaC.
The only challenge in using these tools is that considerable security ex-
pertise can be required to come up with the security requirements for the
application tested, and to write good security test cases based on the re-
quirements. From there on, these tools can be adopted into the development
process like any other acceptance testing tool that produces binary results
for test cases, and requires little to no security expertise on the part of the
developers reviewing the test results.
4.6 Dependency verification
Continuous dependency verification is easy to set up from both the technical
and process perspectives. On the technical side, dependency verification tools
exist for all major languages with package managers. Some tools can also
identify third party libraries even if no package manager is used.
Installing the tools from the relevant package manager is simple, as is
triggering them, and they generally require no initial configuration. In most
cases, the only configuration done will be to ignore some findings. Usually
this is achieved by adding some filters or rules into a tool’s configuration files.
False positives can be one reason for wanting to ignore some findings,
although dependency verification tools rarely produce them. It is also possi-
ble that a found vulnerability concerns a part of the third party library that
is not actually used by the application being developed, and so might not
require any action. In these cases, the ignoring functionality can also be used
to prevent further alerts from the same cause.
The output format of results is in most cases structured plaintext, so
while not understandable by CI systems as-is they are easy to parse into
a binary pass/fail or into a count of found vulnerabilities and/or count of
dependencies with vulnerabilities.
With the same effort, the tools can also be integrated to development
environments via version control system pre-commit or pre-push hooks. Pre-
venting the commit or push if issues are found would make the feedback cycle
for developers even faster than integration into the CI system would.
The simplest process for handling the results in the CI system would be
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to fail the build if any vulnerable dependencies are detected. The team would
then need to verify the issue and either fix it or, in case it does not warrant
any action, ignore it from further results.
For finer-grained handling in CI, each found vulnerability or dependency
with vulnerabilities can be interpreted as a unit test failure from the CI sys-
tem’s perspective. This way, with a bit of tool output parsing and transform-
ing, existing CI functionality can be used to present the amount of findings
in build status views and dashboards. Additionally the individual issues can
be tracked using the CI system’s core functionality.
Doing dependency verification for each commit during active development
is not adequate. It should also be done at regular intervals throughout the
lifecycle of the software because new vulnerabilities are disclosed continually,
not just during the active development phase of an application.
4.7 Summary
We found several guidelines for work management, tool adoption, testing
and results handling to ensure successful adoption of any reviewed security
testing method into a CI process. In addition to these common guidelines,
there are method-specific characteristics that need to be recognized for best
results.
Both technical and process integration were found to be the most straight-
forward for security verification and static security analysis. For the former
this is by design, since CI is central to the whole method. For the latter it is
because the existing tooling and best practices of static analysis can largely
be used as-is.
Configuration checking and dependency verification results can be re-
duced to unit/acceptance test format and handled as such with existing CI
tooling and development process best practices. On the technical side, this
just requires implementing a simple results parser.
The most challenging of the covered methods to apply to continuous
security testing is vulnerability scanning. Practically no tooling to support
its use in CI exists, and neither do established best practices. For most
vulnerability scanners, the main challenge for continuous use is the absence
of cross-scan findings tracking and false positive management mechanisms.
Chapter 5
Case studies
In this chapter, we will go through four case studies in which we integrate
suitable security testing tools into a software project’s CI feedback loop.
For each case, we give a general description of the project as well as a
preliminary analysis based on which we decide what security testing methods
and tools are suitable for use in the project’s CI system. We also provide
observations on both the technical and development process integration of
the selected tools, as well as the actual security testing results achieved by
using the tools.
In each case, we determined the most suitable tools to test via discussion
with the team or team lead, taking into consideration the restrictions on
effort and technology choices imposed by the project. We then handled the
technical setup and integration of the selected tools into the CI system. After
the tools were running as part of the CI system, we briefed the team on the
CI setup and introduced the tools to them. Then, we discussed the possible
ways of handling the output of the tools with the team or team lead, and
had the team agree on a process for handling the security testing results.
If necessary, we then made the relevant changes to the CI configuration to
support the process that the team chose.
After the initial setup phase, our intention was to leave the team mainly
to their own devices and monitor how the tools and their results were used
over a period of some months. Unfortunately, we only managed to properly
keep track of one of the projects after the initial phase.
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5.1 Project A: a Ruby on Rails web applica-
tion backend
The target project of this case study was a web application with a Ruby on
Rails backend that exposes REST APIs that are utilized by an AngularJS
frontend.
The Ruby portion of the codebase was approximately 5000 lines of code.
At the time of this case study in the spring of 2014, the project had
been going on for nearly a year. The development team had consisted of 1-2
developers during the project lifetime. The development process was Scrum.
Jenkins was used for the project’s CI platform.
5.1.1 Preliminary analysis
Due to the small size of the development team, it could accept only minimal
overhead from security testing. In light of this, our options were practically
limited to dependency verification and static analysis tools. We decided to
try static analysis, and see if the overhead from it would be acceptable.
Brakeman was chosen for this case as the most potentially suitable static
analysis tool.
5.1.2 Brakeman
Technical integration of the tool was easy, as it only required adding a gem
into the project’s Gemfile. After this, the tool could be run both on develop-
ment machines locally and in the CI system. Since there was a Jenkins plugin
available, results presentation in CI was also extremely easy. The CI plugin
provided a convenient way of configuring the build to fail or become unstable
based on how many warnings of different confidence levels (high, medium,
weak) were produced. The thresholds could be configured to consider only
new warnings or both new and old warnings.
The CI job was initially configured to determine build status based on
both old and new warnings, with separate thresholds for warnings of different
confidence levels.
For the results handling process, we decided that the team would im-
mediately review and prioritize all high confidence warnings to be fixed as
soon as possible. For these, the threshold for failing the build was set to 1.
Warnings of lower confidence levels were to be reviewed and prioritized in
a more leisurely manner, and they were configured to only set the build as
unstable but never fail it.
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5.1.3 Results
The technical integration of Brakeman was easy for both development envi-
ronments and CI system.
The security testing results produced by Brakeman were encouraging: it
produced a total of 26 (3 High, 3 Medium and 20 weak confidence) security
warnings on initial run, all of which were eventually verified to be valid.
The workflow and development process integration of the tool required
some iterating. The amount of warnings produced by the tool when it was
initially run made the developers reluctant to verify and address the issues
because they thought it would take too much time away from the actual
development work. A contributing factor to this perception was a predispo-
sition to believe the warnings would largely consist of false positives. This
predisposition was the result of us initially warning the developers that static
analysis tools may generate considerable amounts of false positives.
After a superficial review of the results of the initial run, the developers
dismissed all the warnings as false positives. Afterwards they were reluctant
to waste any more time by investigating the initial warnings more thoroughly
or configuring them to be ignored. Since the CI job was configured to deter-
mine build status based on threshold values for warnings of each confidence
level, the developers also quickly started ignoring the static security analysis
job that was constantly flagging failures.
Once we recognized this initial tool adoption failure, the situation was
improved by first going through the initial results more thoroughly with a
developer to conclude that they were in fact all relevant warnings. This gave
the developers greater confidence in the usefulness of the tool, and alleviated
the concerns about how much time the verification of the findings would take.
Second, since the priority of taking action on the warnings was deemed too
low even though the warnings were seen as relevant, the CI job was configured
to only alert on new warnings. The team would then commit to verifying
all new warnings immediately as they are detected. Any actions required by
verified true positives would be placed onto the development team’s backlog
and planned, estimated and prioritized like any other development work.
In the end, the development process integration achieved was satisfactory.
Some effort was required for iterating approaches to find a suitable process
integration method, but the continuous work effort required for reviewing
and managing the scanning results was low.
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5.2 Project B: a Java + Scala web application
backend
This project was a web application consisting of 8 independent, separately
deployed and run modules, with most of the code written in Java. The
smallest of the modules was written in Scala, and much of the frontend in
ActionScript.
The project was at the time of this case study in spring 2014 in mainte-
nance phase, with only small-scale development of new functionality going
on in addition to support tasks. The size of the development and mainte-
nance team was 2-3 developers using Kanban as the development process and
Jenkins as their CI server. The project, and the oldest parts of the codebase,
were 5 years old.
The total lines of Java code was approximately 55000. The Scala module
was some 600 lines of code. The frontend contained 35000 lines of Action-
Script, a considerable portion of which was automatically generated from the
Java code.
5.2.1 Preliminary analysis
Some possible issues that could affect tool adoption were identified before-
hand. One was budgetary concerns: since the project was in maintenance
mode and working with a limited budget, not much work effort could be
expended into this case study. Another issue was the relatively large exist-
ing codebase, which could produce lots of warnings and false positives when
using static analysis tools.
Because of the budgetary and effort allocation constraints we could in
practice only consider least effort approaches, namely dependency verifi-
cation, configuration checking and static analysis. Of these, configuration
checking was ruled out because the project did not have automated infras-
tructure setup. Thus, dependency verification and static analysis were the
selected methods.
The tools selected for use were OWASP Depedency Check and FindSe-
curityBugs.
OWASP dependency check was the tool chosen for dependency verifica-
tion because of the extremely low effort required to set up and maintain
it.
FindSecurityBugs had the following points in its favor:
• Running the tool in either CI or development environments would be
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extremely easy because the tool is available as a Maven plugin and
Maven was the build tool for the Java modules of this project
• Presentation of results in CI would also be effortless since a FindSecu-
rityBugs plugin is available for Jenkins
• Because FindSecurityBugs analyses JVM bytecode, it could also be
used to analyse the module written in Scala
5.2.2 FindSecurityBugs
Integration into a Java module using Maven as a build tool only required the
addition of a single plugin entry to each module’s pom.xml-file to be able to
run the tool in Jenkins CI jobs as well as locally on development machines.
For the Scala module, things were not so simple, since it used SBT as the
build tool. However, with a bit of work we managed to get the tool running
in the CI cycle. This required using SBT to generate a maven pom.xml file
and post-process the generated file to:
1. include the FindSecurityBugs plugin declaration
2. properly handle the submodules that each of the project’s modules was
split into
3. include custom maven repository definitions to be able to access in-
house dependencies
4. correctly resolve snapshot artifacts of dependencies under development
The results of each test run were easily presented and build status thresh-
olds set in Jenkins using the FindBugs Jenkins plugin.
5.2.3 OWASP dependency check
Integration to maven modules was trivial, and only required the addition of
a single plugin entry to each module’s pom.xml-file. Running the tool in CI
via maven was easy. Results presentation was also very easy, since a plugin
for this purpose was available for Jenkins, the CI system used in the project.
For the Scala module built using SBT the process was identical to the
FindSecurityBugs setup described in the previous subsection. We needed
to generate a maven pom.xml-file containing the dependencies and to post-
process the OWASP Dependency Check plugin declaration into it.
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5.2.4 Results
The technical integration of both tools was easy, although some work was
required to get the tools working with the Scala module.
FindSecurityBugs analysis resulted in over 200 warnings, and upon cur-
sory examination, a large portion of them were very general. For example,
each REST API exposed by the applications generated a general reminder
warning to pay attention to user input validation. For the Scala module,
FindSecurityBugs generated only one warning. The single warning was a
false positive.
The large amount of warnings produced by the static analysis combined
with the budgetary constraints of this project meant that it was not feasible
to verify them immediately. Because of this, the process we decided on for
handling the results was two-fold: the results of the initial analysis would be
treated as a baseline and would be reviewed and fixed or ignored in small
amounts over time, whereas new warnings would be reviewed and dealt with
immediately.
OWASP Dependency check found tens of vulnerable dependencies across
the whole project. Overall more than 100 separate publicly disclosed vulner-
abilities existed in the dependencies.
The dependency verification results contained a lot of overlap. This was
because we checked each module separately for vulnerable dependencies, and
most dependencies were shared between modules. For example, all of them
depended on the same database client library. As such, every module’s depen-
dency verification results contained the same warnings about vulnerabilities
in the database client library.
For most cases, this is fine, but in a case like this one with a considerable
part of dependencies being shared across modules, it would be better to ag-
gregate the dependency verification results across all submodules or produce
some kind of overview or other method of visualizing how many submodules
use the same vulnerable dependency. That way the results would more ac-
curately represent the amount of vulnerable dependencies, and prioritizing
which of the dependencies is the most critical to fix would be easier.
For the same reasons behind the process for handling static analysis re-
sults, the agreed process for handling dependency check results was almost
the same.
Firstly, to treat the initial findings as a baseline and have the CI system
alert only on new vulnerabilities.
Second, start with a least effort approach to fixing the vulnerable depen-
dencies. One by one, check which vulnerable dependencies can be upgraded
without causing test failures in CI. Upgrade those without further investiga-
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tion. The rest will require code changes, for example to conform to changed
third party library APIs. Those will be investigated to get an estimate on the
severity of the vulnerability and the effort required to upgrade the library.
The fixes will then be prioritized through the normal work management pro-
cess.
Overall, the development process integration of the selected security test-
ing tools in this case went well. A working process for handling the sizable
amount of warnings produced by the initial tool runs as well as the new
warnings that would be produced in continuous use, while staying within the
work effort restrictions imposed by the project, was successfully adopted.
5.3 Project C: a Scala + Java web application
backend
This case was concerned with a web application backend written mainly in
Scala, with parts in plain Java. The backend was one component of a larger
web service. Active development of the backend with a 2-developer team
started in November 2013.
The development process was Scrum. The team used Jenkins for their CI
server.
At the start of this case study, in January 2014, the codebase was 500
lines of Scala code, and at the end in July 2014 9000 lines of Scala code and
3000 lines of Java code.
5.3.1 Preliminary analysis
This was a promising case since it dealt with a greenfield project in its early
stages of development.
We determined that static analysis of Scala source code or JVM bytecode
could be used for continuous security testing. Also since the application is
a backend that only exposes different APIs for other parts of the larger
web service to use, black-box scanners, plain fuzzing or other methods for
attacking the APIs could be used. In retrospect, dependency verification
methods would also have been a possibility and the most logical first step
towards continuous security testing since the project used Maven and SBT
for dependency management, but we had not yet come across dependency
verification in our research at the time this case study started.
As for constraints, the small size of the development team meant that
only minimal overhead could be accepted into the development process from
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security testing that had not previously been factored into the project’s de-
velopment backlog.
We decided to start with adopting FindSecurityBugs to do static analy-
sis, since by analysing JVM bytecode it could process both Scala and Java
code. After seeing how the adoption of FindSecurityBugs went and how
much overhead it incurred, we could later add other tools, too.
5.3.2 FindSecurityBugs
Integration into the Scala project required a little bit of work because it
was built using SBT instead of Maven, but as this work had already been
performed once for project B (see section 5.2) it did not take nearly as much
effort this time.
The CI job was configured to alert on new vulnerabilities only, and these
were to be checked and verified by the team immediately.
5.3.3 Results
The technical integration of FindSecurityBugs into a Scala project was easy,
but would have required some more work if it had not already been once for
project B in section 5.2.
Although we observed a good adoption of FindSecurityBugs into the de-
velopment process with little overhead, we unfortunately never got back to
integrating more security testing tools into the project’s CI cycle.
FindSecurityBugs generated only four warnings during the duration of
the case study, from January to July 2014. The team assessed all of the
warnings to be false positives. The false positives were two cases of ”use of
weak hashing function (MD5) for message digest” and two of ”potential path
traversal vulnerabilities”. We verified the assessments to have been accurate.
The developers felt that running FindSecurityBugs in CI was useful de-
spite only having produced false positives. According to them, this was be-
cause the vulnerability information provided alongside a warning was good
for raising developers’ security awareness and because verifying the produced
warnings took very little time away from development work.
5.4 Project D: a Java web application back-
end + AngularJS frontend
This case deals with a project whose web application has a Java backend and
AngularJS frontend.
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The backend consists of two separate Java projects, one for actual backend
functionality and another that contains the API of a separate service utilized
by the backend. Both of these used Maven as their build and dependency
management tool. The API project code was imported from an external
source and could not be modified by the team.
The team size was six developers in total, and the development process
was Scrum. Jenkins was used as the project’s CI server.
The size of the frontend codebase was approximately 2000 lines of JavaScript
code. The backend was 9000 lines of Java code.
5.4.1 Preliminary analysis
All of the security testing methods we have covered were determined to po-
tentially be applicable to this project. Static analysis and dependency verifi-
cation tools were available for both languages, and the infrastructure automa-
tion of the project made vulnerability scanning and configuration checking
possible. The team was also sizeable enough that it could conceivably sup-
port security verification tool adoption, if the required security expertise was
available.
The main constraint imposed by the project was that no work effort bud-
get had been allocated for continuous security work, and there was little slack
in the developers’ effort budgets. Some security activities were included in
the later stages of the project’s road map, though. Nevertheless, no secu-
rity experts were continuously available to support the team in continuous
security testing, even if the work effort were re-budgeted.
After discussing the options with the team’s lead developer, we decided
to start with adding dependency verification tools for both the backend and
frontend into the CI cycle. Static analysis could also be applied, but vulner-
ability scanning and security verification frameworks were deemed to require
too much effort and/or security expertise, and configuration checking inap-
plicable due to perceived low payoff.
5.4.2 OWASP Dependency check
Since the project’s CI server was Jenkins and OWASP Dependency Check has
a Jenkins plugin, integration into CI build cycle was as simple as installing the
plugin, adding the proper Maven plugin declaration to the project’s pom.xml-
files and configuring a new Jenkins job for running the tool and presenting
the results.
Process-wise, the CI jobs were configured to mark builds as unstable
on normal or low level warnings, and to mark them as failed on high level
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warnings. The procedure agreed upon for handling these warnings was to
investigate and verify the warnings periodically and either fix the warning
by updating the vulnerable dependency or if the warning is not considered
relevant, mark it as ignored by using the repository’s XML file intended for
this purpose.
Since the team could not make any changes to the API project, the process
for handling vulnerable dependencies found there would just be to notify their
contact person for that project about the finding and hope that something
is done about the issue.
5.4.3 Versions Maven Plugin
For this tool, there was no CI plugin available, but the actual tool itself was
easy to add as a single plugin declaration in the project’s Maven pom.xml-
files. To present the results via build status in CI, we decided to simply
search for a string that the tool always prints in its results if updates are
found to at least one dependency and use that to decide the build status.
The tool needed to be configured to disregard SNAPSHOT, release can-
didate and other such potentially unstable versions when looking for newer
versions of dependencies.
The CI jobs for this tool were configured to mark the build as unstable
always if any newer versions of dependencies were available. The process
for handling unstable builds was decided to be to review all dependencies
for which it reports newer versions are available and either update the de-
pendency or selectively ignore the alert by using the repository’s XML file
intended for this purpose.
5.4.4 Retire.js
For the frontend Angular.JS application, Retire.js was adopted using grunt-
require to check the JavaScript libraries for known vulnerabilities.
The output of the tool was only structured plaintext, so some scripting
was required to interpret and present the results in the CI system. We took
the approach of looking for a string that is present whenever the tool finds
any vulnerable libraries, and configured the CI job to mark the build as
unstable in that case.
5.4.5 FindSecurityBugs
As the project already included FindBugs as a maven plugin to do standard
static analysis in the CI cycle, setting up FindSecurityBugs proved challeng-
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ing. This was because FindSecurityBugs limits the static analysis rules used
by FindBugs to only security-related ones, so modifying the FindBugs config-
uration to enable FindSecurityBugs would have prevented the normal static
analysis from happening.
We might have been able to bypass this issue with additional Maven
project configuration, but unfortunately did not have time to investigate
that possibility further. So instead, we left the normal FindBugs setup as it
was and dropped FindSecurityBugs from this case.
5.4.6 Results
The technical integration of all tools except FindSecurityBugs went smoothly.
After integrating the tools to the project’s CI system, we went through
their usage with the lead developer of the team. He felt that using the tools
was an excellent idea, but that because of current time and effort constraints
the team would probably not be able to do anything about the warnings until
much later.
One probable reason for this was that the security testing tool integration
into the CI system of this project was done, although after discussing the
topic with the lead developer and with his somewhat enthusiastic approval,
on short notice and bypassing the normal work planning and prioritization
process.
Since active adoption of the tools was not deemed to happen immediately,
we went through the usage of the tools with another developer to spread the
knowledge a bit more and increase the chances of successful adoption at some
later stage. We also documented the tools, their usage and the reasoning
behind using them into the project’s wiki with the same developer.
OWASP Dependency Check found on its initial scan that 14 of the 130
dependencies declared in the API project had one or more publicly disclosed
vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, the team could not do much about these,
other than pass the information along and hope something is done about the
issue. For the actual application project, 6 out of the 19 declared dependen-
cies were found to have known vulnerabilities.
Maven Versions Plugin found on the initial run in the API project that
out of the 130 overall dependencies declared, 17 had newer versions available.
For the actual application project, the count was 15 out of 19.
One challenge we ran into with Maven Versions Plugin was that the time
taken to check for updates could be prohibitively long for inclusion into the
test chain of each commit in CI. For example, over 35 minutes was taken to
check for updates for the 130 dependencies spread between 2 maven repos-
itories (Maven Central and internal repository which contained non-public
CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDIES 62
artifacts) in the API project. While the repository package information was
cached for subsequent runs, which were much faster, the run time would be
quite long again once the cache eventually expired. This was a problem with
the CI setup of this case, since it would regularly cause a CI job’s build
to take considerably more time than normal. Because of this, we had to
separate running Maven Versions Plugin from the main build chain into a
separate CI job so it would not block running other tests.
Retire.JS found 34 vulnerabilities among the dependencies declared, in-
cluding dependencies of dependencies recursively.
The success of the development process integration of the security testing
tools in this case was left unclear. We agreed with the team on how each of
the tools would be integrated to the development process, and documented
the tool usage, CI setup and workflow integration for later use. However, the
actual handling of the testing results by the team was postponed to start at
an undefined later date.
5.5 Common observations
We noted that the following things applied in all the cases:
1. The technical integration of the selected tools into each project’s CI
loop was easy.
2. The development process integration, especially of static security anal-
ysis tools, required more careful consideration and followup work.
3. Only a very limited amount of developer effort could be used for initial
or continuous work.
4. The developers seemed to consider the adoption of continuous security
testing into their project’s development workflows useful and necessary.
The main challenge of the development process integration of static secu-
rity analysis arises from the fact that, unlike with dependency verification,
the results cannot reasonably be reduced to a unit test like pass/fail model.
Instead, all results require manual review to first verify the accuracy of the
finding, and then decide on what further actions, if any, are required. Unless
properly managed, this can cause apathy among developers toward security
testing in at least two major ways.
Firstly, developers can feel that the work involved is unnecessary over-
head that slows development and makes them looks bad. This is especially
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dangerous if adequate time and effort is not allocated to security work in the
project’s work planning. A good way to mitigate this danger is to drive all se-
curity work through the normal process, making it visible to all stakeholders
and ensuring that work time is really allocated for it[28].
In addition, adopting continuous security testing practices in the begin-
ning of a project is always easier than introducing them into a project that
is well under way. The findings of security testing done continually from the
start come as a steady trickle that’s easy to manage, whereas introducing
security testing later on can produce a large amount of findings, and thus
unexpected work, at once. Another good mitigation technique is to only
enable a few detection sets for easy-to-understand, relevant vulnerabilities,
and gradually enable more detection sets at a pace that the developers feel
comfortable with.
Secondly, accurate verification of static security analysis findings can re-
quire some level of security expertise on the part of the reviewer. Since most
software developers are not security-inclined, they can feel, as well as really
be, out of their depth when reviewing the findings. There are several ways
to mitigate this danger. One is to have security experts separate from the
developers to review the findings, although that might not be possible for
all organizations or projects. Another is to always have a pair of developers
review a finding together[5]. Finally, having the developers undergo security
training helps, if they have any interest in the topic.
As an example of the pitfalls of findings verification, in the case study of
project A, described in section 5.1, the development team was so strongly
predisposed toward classifying static analysis warnings as false positives that
they regarded all the initial findings as false positives. This was at least partly
caused by us warning them beforehand that some amount of false positives
are usually generated by static analysis tools and stressing that therefore
verifying the warnings is essential before acting on them. When adopting
security testing methods such as static analysis that require verification of
findings, care should be taken to make the development team aware of the
necessity for verification without causing such predispositions.
The budget or work effort available to us was very limited in all cases.
Getting any security expert support was practically off the table, and teams
were reluctant to take up practices that would continually demand developer
effort. This issue was largely caused by how we conducted these studies: in
an ad-hoc manner when opportunity presented itself, bypassing normal work
prioritization and planning.
Since continuous security testing had not been entertained at all in the
project proposals and agreements, no allowances for it had been calculated
into budgets either. This meant that security expert support or major addi-
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Dependency verification Static analysis
OWASP Dependency Check FindSecurityBugs
Brakeman Brakeman
Retire.js
Versions Maven Plugin
Table 5.1: Security testing methods and tools used in the case studies
tional work by developers would require additional budget from the customer
and thus further budget/contract negotiations.
Furthermore, because continuous security work was not taken into ac-
count during project planning, all developer effort towards it would effec-
tively be taken from either other development overhead functions or feature
development. As such, any significant effort spent on continuous security
testing would lessen the chances of reaching the agreed project targets. This
issue would probably not be as significant in internal software development
activities, even though they are also usually budgeted and work effort man-
aged in some way.
A better approach would have been to drive the adoption of the tools via
the normal planning and work prioritization process, as well as include ade-
quate resources for the security testing work in the initial project plan/proposal.
Despite the fact that developers in most cases felt that, due to project
time and work effort allocation constraints, they would likely not be able
to actually do anything about the testing results, they seemed to consider
the adoption of continuous security testing into their project’s development
workflows useful and necessary.
5.6 Summary
In the four case studies, we adopted each of the security testing methods
and tools listed in table 5.6 to at least one software development project’s
CI loop.
Despite being limited to only these two methods because of project con-
straints, we achieved satisfactory testing and integration results. Adopting
and using these tools required little effort, but still produced valuable secu-
rity testing results: multiple real vulnerabilities in the developed applications
were uncovered.
Unfortunately, we managed to monitor the tool usage and results over
several months only in the case study described in section 5.3. For the other
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cases, actual relevant continuous security testing study was thus not really
done. This being the case, we cannot offer more than anecdotal evidence
for the long-term success of our chosen methods of the process integration of
continuous security testing into the software development workflow.
The technical integrations of these tools into the CI systems were mostly
smooth and effortless. This was expected, as the basis for selecting the tools
was that they should give the most payoff for the least amount of effort.
The development process integrations required more careful consideration
and followup work, especially for static security analysis tools. Fortunately,
neither static analysis in general or even static security analysis specifically
are not new phenomenons in the software development world. Both research
as well as literature on good practices is available. For example, ”Secure
Programming with Static Analysis” by Chess and West[10] has some good
pointers on adopting a static security analysis tool.
We had to make do with very little developer effort and no security expert
support, largely because we conducted the case studies in an ad-hoc manner
with a tight schedule when opportunity presented itself, bypassing normal
work prioritization and planning. A better approach to the case studies
would have been to drive the adoption of the tools via the normal planning
and work prioritization processes of the projects. For future projects, con-
tinuous security testing should already be made part of the initial project
plan/proposal to avoid work effort allocation and budgeting challenges.
Chapter 6
Discussion
In this chapter, we first present notable observations and open questions that
have arisen during our work. Then we review the recognized challenges and
limitations of continuous security testing, and acknowledge the limitations of
this work. Finally, we present our ideas for future work related to continuous
security testing.
6.1 Observations and open questions
The technical integration of all reviewed security testing methods into a CI
system is easy. For some tools, the amount of work required is not trivial, but
it is nevertheless not difficult work. This leaves the ease of development pro-
cess integration to be the watershed when considering a method’s suitability
for continuous security testing.
The methods that are most suitable for continuous security testing are
ones that perform a set number of tests whose results do not require further
investigation or verification. The individual results either are inherently of
a pass/fail nature or can be meaningfully interpreted as such. Configuration
checking, security verification and dependency verification fall into this cate-
gory. Because they can be reduced to a unit test like pass/fail results format
from the perspective of the CI system, they can be integrated to the devel-
opment process using established best practices and tooling like any other
unit or acceptance testing type.
The rest of the reviewed security testing methods are characterized by
producing an unforeseeable amount of findings for each test run. The pro-
duced findings are categorized to different confidence levels and always re-
quire manual verification. The development process integration of these
methods is decidedly feasible, but significantly less straightforward than that
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of the methods in the former category. This category contains static security
analysis and vulnerability scanning.
One promising and lightweight approach to the workflow integration of
static security analysis for development teams using pull requests is to auto-
mate the static analysis of a pull request’s changes, and import the warnings
as code review comments into the pull request. For example, pronto1 and
SonarQube via its Github plugin2 can be used to easily post static analysis
results as comments to Github pull requests. Unfortunately, we discovered
this approach too late to try it out in our case studies.
We were pleased to note that static analysis and dependency verification
tools exist for JavaScript, too. While vulnerabilities in the frontend code
might not usually be as dangerous as ones in the backend, they can still
involve for example serious XSS issues.
One question regarding static security analysis that we did not explore
in this work is how to handle a situation where both general static code
analysis and static security analysis are performed. Is it better to present
and process all static analysis results through one report or strictly separate
the security findings from other static analysis results? In a study, Baca[2]
advocates having only a single static analysis report, because out of two
reports the larger will easily get ignored. He also states that security relevant
findings should still be clearly separated from other static analysis warnings
to keep them from being lost among the usually considerably greater amount
of general warnings.
Getting the development team to take ownership of the security testing is
critical for continuous security testing implementation success. Tool adoption
chances can be improved by developer education and good tool selection.
Developers should be educated on efficient use of the tool as well as on the
importance of catching and fixing issues as early as possible[5]. A good
tool is one that fits easily into the development process and produces easily
understandable, highly relevant and actionable warnings[2].
The DevOps movement promotes using tools and reports that are usable
by and understandable to all relevant parties. For software security testing,
these parties include at least security experts, developers, operations person-
nel and the managers deciding about work prioritization. Abiding by this
principle when implementing continuous security testing seems like a good
way of raising general security expertise and awareness of the related work
among all the stakeholder groups. Even if the tools did not catch many
vulnerabilities, the presence of easily accessible and understandable security
1https://github.com/mmozuras/pronto
2http://docs.sonarqube.org/display/PLUG/GitHub+Plugin
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testing tools and reports in the CI loop can encourage stakeholders to self-
improve their understanding of security issues.
6.2 Challenges and limitations of continuous
security testing
It is important to recognize the inherent limitations of an automated, contin-
uous approach to security testing. In general, the methods that lend them-
selves to continuous security testing are ones that find security bugs, but not
design flaws. For example, security analysis of the software architecture is
not considered automatable.
Not understanding the inherent limitations of continuous security testing
can also lead to a false sense of security, which can be very dangerous. While
low-effort continuous security testing is certainly better than no security work
at all, it is no substitute for actual security design or secure coding practices.
As for the actual testing tools and CI system plugins that are freely
available, their quality and maintenance varies greatly. Care must be taken
when selecting a tool. Furthermore, it is prudent to monitor the maintenance
status of the selected tool(s) so that stagnant tools can be replaced in a timely
manner. We expect that this is a significantly smaller issue with commercial
offerings than with the open source tools that we surveyed.
Of the actual security testing tools, only the security verification frame-
works have been designed with CI integration in mind. So very few tools
provide results in any common test result format that CI systems would be
able to readily interpret and present. Some transforming of the test results
thus is needed in almost all cases for example to present a summary of se-
curity test results on a CI job’s status view. Some of the most common tool
and CI system combinations have such functionality available, but most still
require one to implement it themselves.
When planning the adoption of continuous security testing into a devel-
opment process, it should be remembered that the possible testing frequency
is largely determined by the selected testing methods and tools. Some, like
static analysis or dependency verification, can be run for every commit while
for example vulnerability scanners easily take hours to run and so are in most
cases not feasible to run for every commit.
False positive identification and management is a deciding factor for the
usefulness of methods that produce them. A study by Baca et al.[6] con-
cludes that developers, regardless of general developer seniority, are bad at
correctly identifying security vulnerabilities and false positives from static
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analysis tool results. They also note that identification performance for se-
curity vulnerabilities is significantly improved by a combination of security
training and static analysis tool expertise, but that neither improved the
identification rate of false positives.
All of the static analysis tools we reviewed either solely detect security
issues or have a specific category for them, which in our view makes the de-
velopers’ poor performance in identifying security vulnerabilities from among
static analysis results a non-issue.
A very low false positive rate is critical, then, for static analysis tool
usefulness in developer hands. Fortunately, since static analysis findings are
categorized by confidence level, it is possible to limit the analysis to high
confidence findings in developer use to mitigate possible issues from false
positive mis-identification. It is also important to avoid over-emphasizing
false positives when introducing security testing tools to the developers. We
found that doing so can significantly bias them towards categorizing findings
incorrectly as false positives when reviewing security testing results.
Baca et al. also found in a separate study[5] that incorrectly identified
false positives can even lead to actual security issues being introduced by
developers trying to fix the non-existent vulnerability. In the study, they
recommend having at least two developers cooperatively verify findings and
determine how to fix valid ones to increase the likelihood of correct assess-
ment. We concur with this, and note that pair review of results is also a
good practice for spreading security expertise in addition to making individ-
ual assessments more accurate.
The same study[5] also notes that developers are by themselves reluctant
to start using security testing tools, possibly because they do not immediately
see the benefits. It also states the following:
”We conclude that a configuration management approach where
the tool is integrated in the development process as a mandatory
part is the best adoption strategy that is only efficient if devel-
opers are educated in order to make use of the tool to correct
identified vulnerabilities as soon as possible after detection.”
This corroborates that our approach of integrating security testing tools
into the development process via CI system is a sensible one, but also high-
lights the importance of developer education.
Lastly, it is not clear to us how the more general static security analysis
warnings, such as reminders about proper input sanitation when encountering
an exposed API, would best be handled in a continuous testing context. It
is not good to process the alert for every test run, but neither is it smart to
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verify that everything is fine on the first alert and ignore them from there
on out. A method of detecting when the underlying implementation has
changed and triggering a warning only in those cases would be optimal, but
we did not encounter such functionality in the reviewed tools.
6.3 Limitations of this work
Our case studies were performed ad-hoc as the opportunities presented them-
selves. Because of this, we encountered resourcing and schedule challenges
that most likely would have been avoided with a slower, better-planned ap-
proach. The case studies were also conducted in parallel with our research
into security testing methods and tools, so in hindsight more suitable tools
and better tool adoption processes could have been used in most of them.
Additionally, we monitored the tool usage and results over several months
in only one of the four case studies. For the other cases, we have no obser-
vations on how well continuous security testing was adopted as part of the
development process. As such, we cannot draw conclusions about the long-
term successfulness of the workflow and process integration methods.
Furthermore, we tested the software development process integration of
only dependency verification and static analysis tools in the case studies.
Lessons learned from practical implementation experiences are thus missing
for three out of the five investigated security testing methods.
Our tool availability analysis was only covered a section of available tech-
nologies, so we can’t say anything about that for many notable languages
such as C, Objective C, .NET and Go.
The static security analysis papers by Baca et al.[4][5][6] all deal mainly
with analysing C code for security issues with general purpose static analysis
tools. Therefore, their observations might not completely apply to higher
level languages or situations where the static analysis tool only detects secu-
rity issues.
Finally because the review of available methods and tools in 3 was per-
formed in 2014, multiple years before the actual writing of this work was
completed, the analysis of the tools may in cases be obsolete.
6.4 Future research
A common output format for the results of security testing tools would make
it a lot easier to integrate multiple different tools into a CI cycle. While the
output produced by security testing tools is in most cases not as simple as the
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binary pass/fail of unit tests, some reasonable lowest-common-denominator
format could still be conceived. Most output we have seen while working
on this thesis could be represented reasonably well in CI status screens and
dashboards with just a confidence level and a severity. For closer inspection
in CI, a single field for free-form details could be specified to accommodate
the diversity in information provided by different tools. For static analysis
tools, an optional field for referencing the offending source code line would
be good, too.
To complement the common results format, on the CI system’s side some
sort of common core library for security testing results management would be
extremely useful. Something similar to the Jenkins static analysis core3, that
would provide functionality for tracking and management of findings across
consecutive builds, false positive management, issue verification, setting build
status, results presentation and possible other similar things.
Currently, lacking a common results format and CI core, the situation is
OK for static security analysis and security verification: the former’s results
can be handled adequately using existing static analysis handling methods
and the latter frameworks’ results are by design easily handled in CI like any
other acceptance tests. However, the results of configuration checking and
dependency verification tools are easiest to handle by parsing them into some
pass/fail unit test format for the CI system to digest. The most challenging
results are produced by vulnerability scanning, for which no reasonable way
of handling beyond showing an overall pass/fail in the CI system exists. For
them we must instead rely on the tool’s own issue management facilities,
which in most cases do not address consecutive scans in any way.
We also feel that the continuous security testing methods that were in the
end covered only lightly in this work would benefit from further study. Most
notably the possibilities opened up by infrastructure as code and deploy-
ment automation combined with configuration checking and web application
scanning tools, as well as combining existing automated API or end-to-end
tests with a web application scanning proxy sound like promising avenues of
investigation.
One of the challenges we presented in section 6.2 was how to best handle
certain general static security analysis warnings, like reminders to properly
sanitize API input. A possible way to efficiently handle these cases would
be to combine static taint analysis, like utilized by Livshits and Lam[16] or
Baca[2], with static analysis of code diffs like for example Pronto4 enables.
3https://wiki.jenkins-ci.org/display/JENKINS/Static+Code+
Analysis+Plug-ins
4https://github.com/mmozuras/pronto
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We are not aware of any existing implementation for doing this, but the idea
sounds feasible to us. It would amount to mapping access paths to/from the
source code lines that originate the general warnings and issuing a warning
only if the diff intersects with any of the paths.
6.5 Summary of findings
Regarding the research goals we set in Section 1.2, here are the most relevant
findings.
6.5.1 Integration methods
In Chapter 4 we presented several guidelines for work management, tool
adoption, testing and results handling to ensure successful adoption of any
reviewed security testing method into a CI process. In addition to these
common guidelines, we also covered several method-specific characteristics
that need to be recognized for best results.
Both technical and process integration were found to be the most straight-
forward for security verification and static security analysis. For static se-
curity analysis, the most promising integration approach would be to auto-
matically include the findings into the normal PR code review process, to be
handled like any other comments.
Configuration checking and dependency verification were also found to be
relatively easy to integrate, as their results can be reduced to unit/acceptance
test format and handled as such with existing CI tooling and development
process best practices.
Vulnerability scanning turned out to be the most challenging of the cov-
ered methods to apply to continuous security testing. The main causes for
this are lack of tooling and best practices for CI.
Overall, we recommend taking a configuration management approach to
adopting continuous security testing. If feasible, testing results should also
be reduced to a unit/acceptance test format in which they can easily fitted
into the CI workflow like any other tests.
6.5.2 Challenges of continuous security testing
In Section 6.2 we discuss the challenges and limitations of continuous security
testing. First, it is important to recognize that in general the methods that
lend themselves to continuous security testing are ones that find security
bugs, but not design flaws.
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It is also important to avoid a false sense of security that green build
statuses of security jobs in CI may cause. Low-effort continuous security
testing is certainly better than no security work at all, but it is no substitute
for actual security design or secure coding practices.
Another thing is that since the quality and maintenance of freely available
security testing tools and CI system plugins varies greatly, care must be taken
when selecting a tool. Maintenance status of selected tool(s) should also be
monitored so that stagnant tools can be replaced in a timely manner.
Few security testing tools have been designed with CI in mind, so some
effort is likely required to integrate one into the CI process.
False positive identification and management is a deciding factor for the
usefulness of methods that produce them. A tool should have a very low
false positive rate when the results are to be processed by developers.
6.5.3 Characteristics of tools suitable for continuous
security testing
In Section 3.6 we reviewed the characteristics we found to most affect a
tool’s suitability for continuous security testing. The following high-level
characteristics of security testing methods and tools were found to most
affect the suitability for continuous testing:
• Ease of integration into the development workflow
• Initial work required for meaningful results
• Continuous work required alongside software development
• Security expertise required for meaningful use of the tool
These high-level characteristics are the result of many specific features of
the tools and methods. For example, the following features have a positive
with regard to continuous security testing:
• Very low false positive rate
• Results are machine-reducible to pass/fail
• Mechanism for efficient management of findings (incl. false positives)
• Cross-scan issue tracking
Chapter 7
Conclusions
Our goal in this work was to find out if currently available security testing
tools could be leveraged in CI systems to add a basic level of continuous
security testing to a modern software development process. To this end, we
reviewed different security testing methods and currently available tools rep-
resentative of each method to find ones suitable for implementing continuous
security testing. We also conducted four case studies, in which we added
some of the reviewed tools to a software development project’s continuous
integration system and development process.
We found that continuous security testing can be done with current tools
and methods. Multiple different, complementary approaches to implement-
ing it were found to be available depending on the level of expendable effort
and security expertise at hand. Some of these approaches have been re-
cently enabled by the emergence of modern infrastructure and deployment
automation techniques, while others have been possible for longer.
Of the security testing methods investigated, dependency verification is
clearly the easiest starting point for continuous security testing for three
reasons: it is the most straightforward of the available approaches, requires
minimal effort and security expertise, but it still offers tangible results. Thus,
we recommend employing at least continuous dependency verification in all
software development projects from the start.
In our case studies, we were limited to minimum effort approaches and
consequently only tested dependency verification and static analysis tools
as part of the continuous integration systems of the project’s development
processes. Technical integration of the selected tools was found to be easy
in each case, but success in development process integration and team adop-
tion of the tools varied. Nevertheless, the overall results observed during
the case studies were encouraging, as in each case some level of continuous
security testing was achieved with relatively little effort expended and actual
74
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 75
vulnerabilities were uncovered.
Although the technical integration of the reviewed tools into a CI system
was easy, very few of the tools had actually been developed with automation
in mind. Some integration work was therefore usually required. Further re-
search and development towards more seamless integration of security testing
tools into CI systems – for example in the form of a common results format
and CI system libraries or plugins for parsing the said format – could boost
the adoption of these tools and methods considerably.
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